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After Marriage Equality: 
Dual Fatherhood for Married Male 
Same-Sex Couples 
Jessica Feinberg* 
In most states, married male same-sex couples who conceive children via 
gestational surrogacy using sperm from one member of the couple and donor 
ova must pursue adoption in order to establish legal parentage for the 
member of the couple who is not genetically related to the child. This is 
because only a minority of jurisdictions have surrogacy laws that recognize 
the non-biological intended parent as a legal parent in this situation, and 
across the United States cisgender male same-sex couples are excluded from 
the longstanding non-adoptive marriage-based avenues of establishing 
parentage currently available to both different-sex couples and female 
same-sex couples. Marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage, such 
as the marital presumption of parentage and spousal consent to assisted 
reproduction laws, represent the most common way to establish legal 
parentage in an individual other than the person who gave birth to the child. 
The exclusion of male same-sex couples from marriage-based avenues of 
establishing parentage is harmful, unwarranted, and unnecessary. 
Parenting abilities do not depend on sexual orientation or gender. Children 
raised by male same-sex couples fare just as well as children raised by 
different-sex couples and female same-sex couples, and men who function 
as primary caretakers to their children are as capable and effective as 
women who function in that role. Excluding male same-sex couples from 
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage reinforces gender-based 
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stereotypes around caretaking that harm and confine women and men both 
in the workplace and in the domestic sphere. Moreover, the conclusive 
presumption of parentage based upon the act of giving birth, which presents 
a major barrier to the extension of marriage-based avenues of establishing 
parentage to male same-sex couples, is an outdated concept that fails to 
reflect the realities of modern medical technology and the diverse 
circumstances under which children are conceived today. This Article 
advances a comprehensive proposal for extending marriage-based avenues 
of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples. If implemented, the 
proposal will provide a more equitable and effective legal framework for 
parentage establishment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As LGBTQ+ individuals and families have gained greater societal 
acceptance and broader legal rights and protections in recent years,1 it 
has become increasingly common for same-sex couples to welcome 
children into their families.2 When this occurs, the establishment of 
legal parentage for each member of the couple is critically important — 
there are myriad rights, protections, and obligations that stem from a 
legally recognized parent-child relationship. For example, if one 
member of the couple is unable to establish legal parentage, they will 
lack important parental rights relating to, inter alia, custody, visitation, 
and medical decision-making. In addition, the child will be deprived of 
important rights relating to, inter alia, support, inheritance, healthcare, 
and social security that would stem from a legally recognized parent-
child relationship.3 Historically, when a same-sex couple was raising a 
child who was genetically connected to one member of the couple, 
establishing parentage for the other member of the couple was difficult 
and, where possible, required adoption procedures.4 Since non-adoptive 
avenues of establishing parentage generally stem from either actual or 
perceived genetic connections to the child or marriage to the individual 
who gave birth to the child, for most of the nation’s history same-sex 
 
 1 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 680 (2015) (holding that states may 
not “bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of 
the opposite sex”).  
 2 Meredith Larson, Note, Don’t Know Much About Biology: Courts and the Rights of 
Non-Biological Parents in Same-Sex Partnerships, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 869, 872 (2010) 
(“In what some have termed a ‘gayby boom,’ LGBT couples and individuals are taking 
advantage of [assisted reproduction] options to have children at an increasing rate.”). 
 3 Jessica Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward: Extending Voluntary Acknowledgments of 
Parentage to Female Same-Sex Couples, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 113 (2018) 
[hereinafter A Logical Step Forward]. 
 4 Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent?: Revisiting Equitable Parenthood 
Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent 
Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 55-56 (2017) [hereinafter Whither the Functional Parent?]. 
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couples were excluded from non-adoptive avenues of establishing 
parentage for the member of the couple who did not share a genetic 
connection with the child.5 
With the nationwide legalization of same-sex marriage,6 however, 
certain categories of same-sex couples — those in which one member 
of the couple is able to gestate a child (including cisgender female same-
sex couples as well as other same-sex couples in which one or both 
members of the couple, regardless of sex or gender identity, is willing 
and able to carry a child) — have gained increasing access to non-
adoptive marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage.7 Marriage-
based avenues of establishing parentage provide a conclusive or 
rebuttable presumption of legal parentage to the spouse of the 
individual who gave birth to the child.8 The common marriage-based 
avenues of establishing parentage include the marital presumption of 
parentage and spousal consent to assisted reproduction laws.9 
Historically, the marital presumption of parentage provided a rebuttable 
presumption of parentage to the husband of a woman who conceived 
or gave birth to a child during the marriage.10 Spousal consent to 
assisted reproduction laws generally have provided a conclusive 
presumption of parentage to a husband who consents to his wife’s use 
of assisted reproduction with the intent to be the resulting child’s 
parent.11 The extension of these marriage-based methods of establishing 
parentage to female same-sex couples has been relatively 
straightforward. For female same-sex couples who wish to have a child 
who shares a biological or genetic connection with at least one member 
of the couple, it is common for one of the spouses to gestate and give 
birth to the couple’s child.12 As a result, states have been able to extend 
 
 5 Id. 
 6 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 681. 
 7 See infra Part I. 
 8 See infra Part I.A. 
 9 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 105-06. 
 10 Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital 
Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 562-63 (2000). 
 11 COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, SHANNON P. MINTER & CATHERINE SAKIMURA, LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 3:3 (2019). 
 12 Female same-sex couples also may choose to have a child through reciprocal in 
vitro fertilization, in which one member of the couple gestates the child and the other 
member of the couple provides the ova used to conceive the child. When this occurs, 
each member of the couple shares a biological or genetic connection to the child. See 
Lauren B. Paulk, Embryonic Personhood: Implications for Assisted Reproductive 
Technology in International Human Rights Law, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 781, 
788 (2014).  
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laws providing marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to 
female same-sex couples simply by adopting gender neutral language to 
refer to the person who is deemed a parent on the basis of their marriage 
to the individual who gave birth.13  
Cisgender male same-sex couples and other same-sex couples in 
which neither party is able to gestate a child, however, continue to be 
excluded from marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage. 
Cisgender male same-sex couples who wish to have a child who is 
genetically related to one member of the couple require the help of a 
surrogate to gestate and give birth to the child.14 In the vast majority of 
cases, the couple will utilize gestational surrogacy in which the 
surrogate gives birth to a child who was conceived using ova from a 
third-party donor and sperm from one member of the couple.15 Because 
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage provide parentage on 
the basis of an individual’s marriage to the person who gave birth, as 
opposed to an individual’s marriage to the child’s biological parent, 
male same-sex couples who conceive children via surrogacy are unable 
to utilize marriage-based avenues to establish parentage.16 Furthermore, 
only a minority of states have adopted surrogacy laws that recognize 
both members of a male same-sex couple as legal parents when the child 
is conceived via gestational surrogacy using sperm from one member of 
the couple and ova from a donor.17 As a result, in most states, while the 
member of a married male same-sex couple whose sperm was used to 
conceive the child (the biological intended parent) often may obtain 
parentage through existing paternity establishment procedures, his 
 
 13 See infra Part I.A. 
 14 Male same-sex couples in which at least one of the members is transgender may 
not require the help of a third party to gestate and give birth to the child. A transgender 
man may be able to gestate and give birth to the child himself. See, e.g., Nancy Coleman, 
Transgender Man Gives Birth to a Boy, CNN (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2017/07/31/health/trans-man-pregnancy-dad-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/NA2M-
JVT3] (reporting the story of a transgender man who gave birth to the child he shares 
with his cisgender male partner). 
 15 The vast majority of surrogacy arrangements today, approximately, ninety-five 
percent, involve gestational surrogacy. Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy 
Across America, 34 FAM. ADVOC. 32, 33 (2011), https://creativefamilyconnections.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SurrogacyAcrossAmerica.pdf?x33078 [https://perma.cc/ 
43M5-PNSE]. Accordingly, this Article focuses on establishing parentage in the context 
of gestational surrogacy arrangements. 
 16 See infra Part I.C.  
 17 See infra Part II.A.  
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spouse (the non-biological intended parent) must pursue adoption in 
order to establish legal parentage.18  
Excluding male same-sex couples from marriage-based avenues to 
establishing parentage and requiring them to pursue adoption in order 
to establish both members as the child’s legal parents is problematic for 
a number of reasons. Adoption is often an expensive, lengthy, and 
invasive process.19 Importantly, until the adoption is completed, which 
may take months or longer, the non-biological intended parent is not a 
legal parent.20 This leaves both the child and the non-biological 
intended parent without essential rights and protections and in a state 
of uncertainty.21 The exclusion of male same-sex couples from 
marriage-based parentage establishment avenues also sends the harmful 
message that families headed by male same-sex couples are inferior and 
less deserving of legal recognition than families headed by different-sex 
couples or female same-sex couples.22 
The continuing exclusion of male same-sex couples from marriage-
based avenues of establishing parentage likely stems both from the 
conclusive presumption of legal parentage that often attaches to an 
individual based upon the act of giving birth and the pervasive gender-
based stereotypes and beliefs about caretaking and parenting that 
continue to linger today.23 The application of a conclusive presumption 
of legal parentage to the individual who gave birth creates a significant 
barrier to extending marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage 
to male same-sex couples. If conclusive legal parentage attaches to the 
individual who gave birth, extending marriage-based parentage 
presumptions to the same-sex spouse of the child’s biological father 
would result in the establishment of legal parentage in at least three 
people simultaneously: the individual who gave birth, the biological 
father, and the biological father’s spouse. This presents a significant 
problem, since the vast majority of jurisdictions only recognize a 
maximum of two legal parents.24 In addition, providing individuals who 
give birth with a status — conclusive legal parentage — that generally 
 
 18 Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2308 (2017) (“In 
most states, nonbiological fathers in same-sex couples cannot establish parentage 
without adoption, even when they are married.”). 
 19 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 110-11. 
 20 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2317-18. 
 21 Id. at 2318. 
 22 See id. at 2322-23. 
 23 See infra Part III. 
 24 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 134 (“[T]he law in the vast 
majority of states recognizes a maximum of two legal parents for each child.”). 
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can be voluntarily terminated only in specified, narrow circumstances 
involving adoption proceedings, confines parentage establishment for 
male same-sex couples who conceive via surrogacy to the realm of 
adoption.25 Another significant barrier to extending marriage-based 
avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples involves the 
longstanding societal beliefs that women should be primarily 
responsible for the domestic sphere and that women are more capable 
than men at caretaking and parenting.26 Throughout the years, the law 
has reflected and served to reinforce these gendered beliefs.27 
These barriers, however, should not preclude the extension of 
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex 
couples. The conclusive presumption of parentage based upon the act 
of giving birth is an outdated concept that fails to reflect the realities of 
modern medical technology and the diverse circumstances under which 
children are conceived today.28 Reform to make the legal parentage that 
attaches to an individual based upon the act of giving birth rebuttable 
in appropriate circumstances is long overdue. Moreover, the gendered 
stereotypes and expectations regarding parenting abilities and 
responsibilities are not only inaccurate29 but also extremely harmful to 
both women and men.30 Laws that challenge and dismantle the 
gendered stereotypes that continue to linger about the familial roles of 
women and men, such as those that facilitate parentage establishment 
for male same-sex couples, will promote greater equality both in the 
workplace and in the home.31  
This Article proposes that states adopt standards providing for the 
rebuttal and disestablishment of the presumed legal parentage of the 
individual who gave birth when the individual is not genetically related 
to the child and undertook conception in conjunction with the intended 
parents with the mutual intent and understanding that the intended 
parents would be the child’s sole legal parents. This Article further 
proposes that states amend their marriage-based avenues of establishing 
parentage such that these avenues extend to the spouse of the child’s 
biological, legally recognized father upon the rebuttal and 
disestablishment of the presumed legal parentage of the individual who 
gave birth. Extending marriage-based avenues of parentage 
 
 25 See infra notes 149–53 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra Part III.B. 
 27 See infra Part III.B. 
 28 See infra notes 129–32 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra Part IV.B. 
 31 See infra Part IV.B. 
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establishment to male same-sex couples is an essential component of 
attaining equality for male same-sex couples in the parentage realm. 
While advancing surrogacy laws that recognize intended parents as 
legal parents regardless of gender or sexual orientation is also an 
extremely important goal, many states still have not passed laws 
addressing surrogacy and some states prohibit the practice.32 A 
substantial number of states may find it easier or more palatable to 
facilitate parentage establishment for male same-sex couples by 
extending the longstanding avenues of establishing parentage that 
already exist, such as marriage-based avenues, as opposed to creating 
new avenues of parentage establishment, such as surrogacy-based 
avenues.33 It is important to note that while this Article explores the 
issue through the lens of the historical and current legal and societal 
treatment of cisgender men and cisgender male same-sex couples, the 
problematic, exclusionary effects of the parentage laws discussed 
extend to any couple who chooses to pursue gestational surrogacy 
utilizing sperm from one member of the couple and donor ova, 
regardless of the gender makeup of the couple. 
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I provides an 
overview of the non-adoptive marriage-based avenues of establishing 
parentage that are available to different-sex couples and female same-
sex couples, but do not extend to male same-sex couples. Part II 
discusses the current state of the law governing parentage establishment 
for married male same-sex couples when a child is conceived via 
gestational surrogacy using sperm from one member of the couple and 
ova from a donor. Part III analyzes the barriers to extending marriage-
based avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples, 
focusing on the presumption of legal parentage that attaches to an 
individual based upon the act of giving birth and the lingering gender-
based stereotypes and assumptions that exist around parenting. Part IV 
explores the myriad reasons that support extending marriage-based 
parentage establishment avenues to male same-sex couples. Finally, 
Part V sets forth a comprehensive proposal for extending marriage-
based avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples who 
 
 32 See ALEX FINKELSTEIN, SARAH MAC DOUGALL, ANGELA KINTOMINAS & ANYA OLSEN, 
COLUMBIA LAW SCH. SEXUALITY & GENDER LAW CLINIC, SURROGACY LAW AND POLICY IN THE 




 33 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2342. 
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conceive children via gestational surrogacy using sperm from one 
member of the couple and donor ova. 
I. CURRENT NON-ADOPTIVE MARRIAGE-BASED AVENUES OF 
ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE 
When one member of a married different-sex couple conceives or 
gives birth to a child during the marriage, the legal parentage of their 
spouse generally is established through a non-adoptive marriage-based 
avenue. Due to the fact that same-sex couples could not legally marry 
for most of the nation’s history, the marriage-based avenues used to 
establish parentage for the spouse of the individual who gave birth were, 
for a long time, simply unavailable to same-sex couples. In 2004, 
however, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex 
marriage.34 Between 2004 and 2015, the legalization of same-sex 
marriage expanded rapidly throughout the United States, culminating 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which struck 
down the remaining state bans on same-sex marriage.35 Obergefell set 
forth the important proposition that states may not “bar same-sex 
couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the 
opposite sex.”36 As a result, same-sex spouses of individuals who give 
birth now have significantly greater access to the non-adoptive 
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage enjoyed by their 
different-sex counterparts.  
A. Establishing the Spouse’s Legal Parentage Through the Marital 
Presumption of Parentage 
The marital presumption of parentage, under which a husband was 
presumed to be the legal father of any child born to or conceived by his 
wife during the marriage, arose from English common law.37 In the 
United States, the marital presumption has served as a core component 
of the law governing parentage since the nation’s inception.38 Early 
justifications for the marital presumption included that it protected 
children from being deemed illegitimate, a status which deprived 
 
 34 Looking Back at the Legalization of Gay Marriage in Mass., BOS. GLOBE (June 26, 2015, 
12:26 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/06/26/looking-back-legalization-gay-
marriage-mass/uhCeyrSeJtWty9tSUde1PI/story.html [https://perma.cc/3H29-MB9G]. 
 35 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015). 
 36 Id. at 680.  
 37 Glennon, supra note 10, at 562. 
 38 Jessica Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal of the Marital Presumption for the Modern 
Era, 104 MINN. L. REV. 243, 243 (2019) [hereinafter Restructuring Rebuttal]. 
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children of significant legal rights and protections and carried a 
profound stigma;39 avoided “evidentiary impasses”40 and provided 
parentage to the man viewed as most likely to be the child’s biological 
father during a time when scientific advancements did not yet allow for 
the definitive determination of biological paternity;41 promoted 
parenthood within marriage;42 protected the harmony and integrity of 
the marital family unit;43 and reduced government spending by 
ensuring that more children had two legal parents obligated to support 
them from the time of birth.44 Although a number of the early 
justifications for applying the marital presumption no longer carry the 
same weight (the Supreme Court has struck down laws providing for 
the unequal treatment of non-marital children in a number of important 
areas45 and technology now allows for the efficient determination of 
biological parentage46), there are a number of remaining justifications 
for the continued application of the marital presumption.  
Common justifications set forth for the continued use of the marital 
presumption relate to promoting children’s best interests and protecting 
 
 39 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989) (“The primary policy rationale 
underlying the common law’s severe restrictions on rebuttal of the presumption appears 
to have been an aversion to declaring children illegitimate, thereby depriving them of 
rights of inheritance and succession, and likely making them wards of the state.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 40 Debi McRae, Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Best Interests Marital Presumption 
of Paternity: It Is Actually in the Best Interests of Children to Divorce the Current 
Application of the Best Interests Marital Presumption of Paternity, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & 
FAM. ADVOC. 345, 349-50 (2006). 
 41 Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional Parenthood’s Promise, 64 BUFF. L. 
REV. 465, 478 (2016) (“And, in the majority of instances, a mother’s husband is, indeed, 
the child’s biological father.”); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and 
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 
317 (“[O]ne presumptive purpose [of the marital presumption] has been the 
codification of empirical inference — the best available method of determining factual 
biological paternity. Who is the biological father? The most likely candidate is the man 
having sexual intercourse with the mother. Who is most likely having sexual 
intercourse with the mother? Her husband.”). 
 42 See Glennon, supra note 10, at 590-91. 
 43 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125. 
 44 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of 
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 246-47 (2006). 
 45 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (inheritance); Gomez v. Perez, 
409 U.S. 535 (1973) (child support); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 
164 (1972) (workers’ compensation benefits); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) 
(wrongful death claims). 
 46 Paternity Blood Tests and DNA, FINDLAW, https://family.findlaw.com/paternity/ 
paternity-tests-blood-tests-and-dna.html (last updated Oct. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ 
H2VE-QLJC]. 
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marriages and marital family units. The marital presumption is a simple, 
efficient method of providing a child born to a married individual with 
a second legal parent from the time of birth.47 Providing children with 
two legal parents — each of whom has a duty to care for and support 
the child — from the earliest possible point, promotes both children’s 
best interests48 and societal interests.49 Furthermore, the popular belief 
that children benefit from being raised within a marital family has 
persisted.50 In addition, the presumption protects the harmony and 
integrity of marriages, and stable marital families are considered “a 
critical social good.”51 Importantly, in the vast majority of instances 
involving a child born to a married individual, the marital presumption 
is never challenged.52 Thus, the marital presumption generally serves to 
protect both “the integrity of the marriage” and the relationship that has 
 
 47 Mikaela Shotwell, Note, Won’t Somebody Please Think of the Children?!: Why Iowa 
Must Extend the Marital Presumption to Children Born to Married, Same-Sex Couples, 15 
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 141, 144 (2012) (“Because this legal status carries with it a 
number of rights and duties, the marital presumption, in effect, ‘gives the child a legal 
father who must provide care and support for the child.’” (quoting Kathy T. Graham, 
Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents, and Their Children’s Rights as Children, 48 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1008 (2008))); see Jacobs, supra note 41, at 470 (stating that 
the presumption has “ease of application”). 
 48 William M. Lopez, Note, Artificial Insemination and the Presumption of Parenthood: 
Traditional Foundations and Modern Applications for Lesbian Mothers, 86 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 897, 903 (2011) (“[C]hildren benefit from the simple fact of having a legally 
recognized relationship with both parents . . . .”); Jennifer B. Mertus, Note, In re 
Adoption of R.B.F.: A Step Toward the Recognition and Acceptance of Non-Traditional 
Families, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 171, 185 (2003) (“Having two legal 
parents, regardless of their sexuality, provides many economic, legal, and psychological 
benefits to a child.”). 
 49 Appleton, supra note 44, at 246 (“A less altruistic version of the child-welfare 
rationale for the presumption of legitimacy shifts the focus to the public or society in 
general. On a purely practical level, the law’s preference for the marital family long has 
helped protect the public purse and the public interest in clear rules of descent.”); see 
also Mark Strasser, Presuming Parentage, 25 TEX. J. WOMEN GENDER & L. 57, 60 (2015). 
 50 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646 (2015) (discussing “the significant 
material costs of being raised by unmarried parents,” including being “relegated to a 
more difficult and uncertain family life”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 
309, 383 (2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting) (describing marriage as “the foremost setting 
for the education and socialization of children”); Appleton, supra note 44, at 243 
(“According to one popular understanding today, the presumption of legitimacy has 
served and should continue to serve a child-welfare objective.”); Glennon, supra note 
42, at 590-91 (“Courts often justify privileging the marital relationship on the ground 
that parenthood within marriage best protects children.”). 
 51 Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 39 n.25 
(2006). 
 52 Leslie Joan Harris, Obergefell’s Ambiguous Impact on Legal Parentage, 92 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 55, 67 (2017). 
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formed between the spouse of the individual who gave birth and the 
child.53 Today, every state continues to apply the marital presumption 
in some form,54 and it remains the most common way of establishing an 
individual other than the person who gave birth as a child’s legal 
parent.55 
With regard to the application of the marital presumption of 
parentage to same-sex spouses of individuals who give birth, while 
Obergefell did not explicitly discuss the extension of the marital 
presumption to same-sex couples, it held that states must provide 
marriage to same-sex couples on the “same terms” accorded to 
different-sex couples.56 As a result, states’ marital presumptions of 
parentage should apply equally to same- and different-sex spouses of 
individuals who give birth.57 The Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in 
Pavan v. Smith provides strong additional support for the argument that 
Obergefell requires the extension of the marital presumption of 
parentage to same-sex spouses of individuals who give birth.58 In Pavan, 
the Court, applying Obergefell, held that because Arkansas law generally 
requires the name of the different-sex spouse of an individual who gave 
birth to appear on a child’s birth certificate, the state could not refuse 
to list the name of the same-sex spouse of an individual who gave birth 
on the child’s birth certificate.59 
Most courts that have addressed the issue of whether a state’s marital 
presumption of parentage extends to the same-sex spouse of an 
individual who gives birth have answered the question in the 
affirmative.60 Moreover, several jurisdictions have amended their 
 
 53 Id.  
 54 Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody 
and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 622-23 (2009). 
 55 Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1647, 
1659 (2015). 
 56 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646 (2015). With its extension to female 
same-sex couples, it makes more sense to refer to the presumption as the “marital 
presumption of parentage” as opposed to the “marital presumption of paternity.”  
 57 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 5:22 (“After Obergefell v. Hodges, all marriage-
based parentage rules — including the marital presumption — should be applied 
equally to same-sex spouses . . . .”). 
 58 Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017). 
 59 Id. However, Pavan concerned only birth certificates, not the presumption of 
parentage itself, and generally “a birth certificate is merely prima facie evidence of the 
information stated within.” JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 5:25. 
 60 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Jones ex rel. Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 496-98 (Ariz. 2017) 
(holding that the marital presumption extends to the same-sex spouse of an individual 
who gives birth); Barse v. Pasternak, 2015 WL 600973, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2015) 
(same); Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 340-41 (Iowa 2013) 
  
2021] After Marriage Equality 1519 
marital presumption statutes to clarify that the presumption applies to 
the spouse of an individual who gives birth regardless of the spouse’s 
sex.61 In addition, a number of states’ parentage laws indicate that, 
insofar as is practicable, provisions addressing the determination of 
paternity should apply to determinations of maternity.62 It seems 
 
(same); Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601, 603 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (same); 
Christopher YY v. Jessica ZZ, 159 A.D.3d 18, 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (same); In re 
Joseph O. v. Danielle B., 158 A.D.3d 767, 769-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (same); see also 
Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 709 
(2014) (“Most states that recognize same-sex marriages, for example, also extend the 
marital presumption of paternity to gay and lesbian couples . . . .”); cf. Chaisson v. State, 
239 So. 3d 1074, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 2018) (“The Registrar maintains the presumption 
of parentage for the non-child bearing spouse provided for [under Louisiana law] is not 
biologically based but is based on the marriage contract in existence at the time of [the 
child’s] birth. Thus, the Registrar is legally required to provide equal protection to same 
sex couples seeking to amend a birth certificate, under Obergefell . . . .”); Miller-Jenkins 
v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 968-70 (Vt. 2004) (ruling that because civil unions 
granted same-sex couples all of the rights and obligations of marriage, the marital 
presumption of parentage applied to same-sex couples who had entered into civil 
unions). However, not all courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., 
Paczkowski v. Paczkowski, 128 A.D.3d 968, 969 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (holding that 
the statutory marital presumptions of paternity did not apply to the wife of woman who 
conceived a child during the marriage, “since the presumption of legitimacy [the 
statutes] create is one of a biological relationship, not of legal status . . . and, as the non-
gestational spouse in a same-sex marriage, there is no possibility that [the wife] is the 
child’s biological parent”) (citations omitted); Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470, 474 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. 2014) (declining to apply the marital presumption of paternity to a same-sex 
couple and explaining that the state’s “Marriage Equality Act does not require the court 
to ignore the obvious biological differences between husbands and wives”); In re A.E., 
2017 WL 1535101, at *8 (Tex. App. 2017) (declining to apply the marital presumption 
to a same-sex couple and stating that “Obergefell did not hold that every state law related 
to the marital relationship or the parent-child relationship must be ‘gender neutral’”). 
 61 NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2339. 
 62 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-122 (2020) (“Any interested party may 
bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child 
relationship. Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this article applicable to the father 
and child relationship apply.”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.106 (2020) (“The 
provisions of this chapter relating to the determination of paternity apply to a 
determination of maternity.”); see also JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:19 (“Courts in a 
growing number of states — including Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
and Virginia — have held that [paternity] provisions must be applied in a gender-
neutral manner.”); NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2294 (“In many states, such application 
has been aided by explicit gender-neutrality directives modeled on the UPA. The 
original UPA provides that in actions ‘to determine the existence or nonexistence of a 
mother and child relationship[,] [i]nsofar as practicable, the provisions . . . applicable 
to the father and child relationship apply.’ The revised UPA includes a similar directive, 
stating that the provisions ‘relating to determination of paternity apply to 
determinations of maternity.’”).  
  
1520 University of California, Davis [Vol. 54:1507 
probable that in the coming years, as more parentage disputes arise 
involving children born to same-sex spouses, more states will explicitly 
extend the marital presumption of parentage to encompass same-sex 
spouses of individuals who give birth. Furthermore, assuming that 
Obergefell and Pavan are not overturned, it is likely that all states that 
wish to maintain the marital presumption will need to extend it to same-
sex spouses of individuals who give birth.63  
It is important to note that while the extension of existing state 
marital presumption of parentage standards to same-sex spouses is an 
important step that will be effective in providing parentage to same-sex 
spouses in situations in which the presumption is never challenged, the 
grounds for rebuttal, which have always centered on proving a lack of 
genetic connection between the spouse of the individual who gave birth 
and the child, will need to be restructured in order for the presumption 
to fully and meaningfully encompass same-sex couples.64 Since in most 
cases involving same-sex couples the spouse of the individual who gave 
birth will not be genetically connected to the child, to create a marital 
presumption that fairly, logically, and effectively encompasses same-sex 
couples, states must engage in the important undertaking of 
restructuring their current standards so that a spouse’s lack of genetic 
connection to the child, by itself, is no longer the basis for rebuttal (at 
least in cases of nonsexual conception).65 There are a number of other 
ways to structure rebuttal of the marital presumption, such as requiring, 
in addition to proof of a lack of genetic connection between the spouse 
and child, proof of a lack of mutual intent between the parties for the 
spouse to be the child’s legal parent or proof of a lack of parental 
function on the part of the spouse.66 Overall, while there is still work to 
be done with regard to the grounds for rebuttal, the extension of the 
marital presumption of parentage to same-sex spouses of individuals 
who give birth is a critically important development that will provide 
significantly more same-sex couples with a simple and inexpensive 
method of establishing parentage.  
 
 63 Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 38, at 257. 
 64 See generally id. (arguing that restructuring the marital presumption of parentage 
so that a spouse’s lack of genetic connection to the child is no longer the basis for 
rebuttal is essential to establishing a marital presumption that effectively encompasses 
same-sex couples). 
 65 Id. at 246. 
 66 Id. at 271. 
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B. Establishing the Spouse’s Legal Parentage Through Consent to 
Assisted Reproduction Laws 
Another common marriage-based avenue to establishing parentage 
stems from state laws that provide parentage to an individual based 
upon that individual having provided their consent to their spouse’s use 
of assisted reproduction to conceive a child. Under existing statutory or 
common law rules throughout the United States, a husband who 
consents to his wife’s use of assisted reproduction with the intent to be 
the resulting child’s parent is deemed a legal parent regardless of 
whether the child is conceived using the husband’s sperm or donor 
sperm.67 In some jurisdictions, the laws providing parentage based upon 
a husband’s consent to his wife’s use of assisted reproduction require 
that the husband’s consent be in writing, that the procedure be 
performed by or under the supervision of a physician, or both.68 In at 
least one state, the spousal consent to assisted reproduction law’s 
application is restricted to situations involving only certain types of 
assisted reproduction procedures.69  
Under Obergefell and Pavan, spousal consent to assisted reproduction 
laws should extend to a same-sex spouse who, with the intent to be the 
resulting child’s parent, consents to their spouse’s use of assisted 
reproduction to conceive a child.70 Most courts that have addressed the 
issue have ruled that assisted reproduction statutes that on their face 
provide parentage only to husbands who consent to their wives’ use of 
assisted reproduction to conceive a child also apply to wives who 
consent to their wives’ use of assisted reproduction to conceive a child.71 
 
 67 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 3:3. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Patton v. Vanterpool, 302 Ga. 253, 256 (2017) (holding that the state’s 
assisted reproduction statute, which “creates an irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy 
with respect to all children born within wedlock or within the usual period of gestation 
thereafter who were conceived by means of artificial insemination” when both spouses 
consented to the procedure in writing, did not apply in situations in which the child 
had been conceived via in vitro fertilization (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
 70 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 3:3 (“After the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges 
requiring that states permit and recognize marriages between same-sex spouses on the 
‘same terms and conditions’ as for different-sex spouses, these rules . . . must be applied 
equally to same-sex couples who have children through assisted reproduction during 
their marriage.”). 
 71 Id. § 3:4 (“A number of courts have held that gendered assisted reproduction 
provisions must be applied equally to a female intended parent . . . There are a small 
number of courts, however, that have resisted these trends and directions.”); NeJaime, 
supra note 18, at 2294 (“[C]ourts that have considered the issue in other states have, 
almost without exception, applied these statutes to married same-sex couples.”). 
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In addition, a growing number of states are adopting spousal consent to 
assisted reproduction statutes that contain gender-neutral terms in 
reference to the class of individuals who may use this avenue to 
establish their legal parentage.72 Furthermore, as noted above, a number 
of states’ parentage laws indicate that provisions that apply to paternity 
determinations should be interpreted, insofar as is practicable, to apply 
to maternity determinations.73 Importantly, especially for same-sex 
couples, while in most states the marital presumption of parentage 
provides the spouse of the individual who gives birth with only a 
rebuttable presumption of parentage, the parentage for the spouse 
established by consent to assisted reproduction laws generally is 
conclusive and irrefutable.74 However, even for married couples who 
conceive through assisted reproduction, the existence of both types of 
marriage-based avenues to establishing parentage (the marital 
presumption of parentage and spousal consent to assisted reproduction 
laws) is essential, as the marital presumption serves as an important 
safety net in situations where the formal requirements of spousal 
consent to assisted reproduction laws have not been satisfied.75 
C. The Limited Reach of Existing Non-Adoptive Marriage-Based 
Avenues of Establishing Parentage 
The extension to same-sex couples of non-adoptive marriage-based 
avenues to establishing parentage represents a critical step in the right 
direction towards providing equitable treatment for same-sex parents 
and their children. Unfortunately, however, thus far the extension of 
non-adoptive marriage-based avenues to establishing parentage 
generally has reached only one subset of married same-sex couples: 
those in which one member of the marital unit has carried and given 
birth to the child in question.76 This is because the existing 
“[p]resumptions of parentage for the second parent, even when they 
 
 72 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 3:4; NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2294 n.163. 
 73 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 74 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 3:4 (“[I]f an assisted reproduction statute applies, 
it often is the most direct and strongest claim since it typically provides for a conclusive, 
nonrebuttable basis for establishing parentage.”). 
 75 See Wendy G–M. v. Erin G–M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 853-55 (Sup. Ct. 2014) 
(holding that although the parties had not complied with the formal requirements of 
the spousal consent to assisted reproduction statute, the marital presumption provided 
a separate means for establishing the spouse’s parentage). 
 76 NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2312. But see In re Maria-Irene D., 153 A.D.3d 1203, 
1205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (applying the marital presumption of parentage to the 
biological father’s same-sex spouse). 
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apply to both women and men, relate to that person’s marriage to ‘the 
woman giving birth.’”77 For married cisgender male same-sex couples, 
however, neither member of the couple is able to give birth to the child; 
instead, the couple must utilize a surrogate in order to have a child who 
is genetically related to one member of the couple.78 Thus, because the 
existing non-adoptive marriage-based avenues to establishing parentage 
stem from marriage to the individual who gave birth to the child, as 
opposed to marriage to the child’s biological parent, married male same-
sex couples are excluded from these simple, efficient avenues of 
establishing parentage.79 Instead, married male same-sex couples who 
utilize surrogacy to conceive a child who is genetically related to one 
member of the couple must pursue other avenues to establish both 
members of the couple as the child’s legal parents. 
II. CURRENT METHODS OF ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE FOR MARRIED 
MALE SAME-SEX COUPLES WHO UTILIZE GESTATIONAL SURROGACY 
When a married cisgender male same-sex couple utilizes surrogacy, 
only one member of the couple, at most, will share a genetic connection 
to the child. Consequently, there necessarily will be one member of the 
couple who is a non-biological intended parent and thus cannot 
establish his parentage through the existing avenues that allow men to 
establish parentage on the basis of actual or perceived biological 
connections to a child.80 The non-biological intended parent also 
generally cannot establish his parentage through existing non-adoptive 
marriage-based avenues.81 As detailed above, the current marriage-
based methods of establishing parentage stem from an individual’s 
marriage to the person who gave birth to the child as opposed to an 
individual’s marriage to the child’s biological parent.82 As a result, while 
 
 77 NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2312. 
 78 Jenna Casolo, Campbell Curry-Ledbetter, Meagan Edmonds, Gabrielle Field, 
Kathleen O’Neill & Marisa Poncia, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 20 GEO. J. GENDER 
& L. 313, 344 (2019) (“Because LGBT men cannot reproduce on their own, they must 
have the cooperation and support of a woman to act as their surrogate.”). 
 79 Libby Adler, Inconceivable: Status, Contract, and the Search for a Legal Basis for 
Gay & Lesbian Parenthood, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 17 (2018) (“Indeed, the most recent 
version of the Uniform Parentage Act . . . maintains automatic parenting rights for a 
birth mother and then presumes parentage for the birth mother’s spouse, but the spouse 
of a male biological parent acquires no such presumption.”); NeJaime, supra note 18, at 
2314 (“Ordinary parentage rules simply do not permit dual parentage for male same-
sex couples absent adoption.”).  
 80 NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2312. 
 81 See supra Part II. 
 82 See supra Part II. 
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a number of non-adoptive avenues of establishing parentage may be 
available to the biological intended parent, surrogacy law generally 
represents the only potential non-adoptive avenue through which the 
non-biological intended parent can establish parentage.  
Surrogacy typically involves an agreement between the surrogate and 
intended parent(s) providing that the surrogate agrees to become 
pregnant through the use of assisted reproduction and to relinquish 
parental rights to any resulting child to the intended parent(s).83 In the 
context of gestational surrogacy, which is estimated to represent 
approximately 95% of all surrogacy arrangements today,84 the surrogate 
is not genetically connected to the child.85 Instead, ova and sperm from 
the intended parent(s) or gamete donor(s) are used to create the embryo 
that will be implanted in the surrogate.86 It has become increasingly 
common for both male same-sex couples and different-sex couples 
wherein medical issues make it risky or impossible for the wife to carry 
a child to pursue gestational surrogacy arrangements.87 According to a 
report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, between 
2005 and 2014, the number of embryo transfers that involved 
gestational surrogates almost doubled.88  
In the United States, surrogacy is a complex area of the law and legal 
regulation of gestational surrogacy varies dramatically by jurisdiction. 
Slightly under half of states have statutes that explicitly address 
gestational surrogacy, some states have only case law addressing 
gestational surrogacy, and still other states have no statutory or case law 
governing gestational surrogacy.89 A few states consider surrogacy 
 
 83 Casolo et al., supra note 78, at 330. 
 84 Hinson & McBrien, supra note 15, at 33. 
 85 See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2014 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 52 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2014-
report/art-2014-national-summary-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6VB-X9FL]. In 
contrast, “[a] traditional surrogate supplies both the egg, or genetic component, and the 
gestational role of carrying the pregnancy to term.” Casolo et al., supra note 78, at 316. 
 86 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:1; ROBERT JOHN KANE & LAWRENCE E. SINGER, THE 
LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IN ILLINOIS § 35:9 (2019). 
 87 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:1 n.1; Paige Lyons, Are You My Mother?: Equality 
for Same-Sex Parents in Texas Following Obergefell, 51 TEX. TECH L. REV. 241, 250 (2019); 
Nara Schoenberg, Gay Men Increasingly Turn to Surrogates to Have Babies, CHICAGO TRIB. 
(Nov. 23, 2016, 8:59 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/sc-gay-men-
having-babies-health-1130-20161123-story.html [https://perma.cc/PV5K-YZXB].  
 88 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 85, at 52. 
 89 FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 8; see JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:12; 
NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2376 app. E. 
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contracts void and unenforceable.90 In the jurisdictions that have 
statutes or appellate case law recognizing the enforceability of at least 
some categories of gestational surrogacy agreements, there are different 
approaches relating to issues such as, inter alia, the procedure for 
entering into the agreement, who is eligible to serve as a surrogate, 
whether and to what extent the surrogate can be compensated, and the 
types of substantive provisions that may be included in the agreement.91 
For example, in many states the parties to the surrogacy contract must 
be represented by independent legal counsel, and the surrogate, the 
intended parents, or both, must undergo psychological and medical 
evaluations.92 A couple of states require either a home study of the 
intended parents, judicial preauthorization of the surrogacy agreement 
(meaning a court must approve the agreement before the surrogate 
becomes pregnant), or both.93 A number of states mandate that to be 
eligible to serve as a surrogate, the individual must have had at least one 
prior pregnancy that was carried to term.94 In some states only 
uncompensated surrogacy is permitted, while other states permit 
compensated surrogacy.95 
Importantly, the jurisdictions with statutes or appellate case law 
governing gestational surrogacy also differ with regard to the categories 
of intended parents who are eligible to enter into enforceable surrogacy 
agreements.96 In states that recognize the enforceability of at least some 
gestational surrogacy agreements, the approaches to the categories of 
 
 90 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2020) (stating that no person may enter 
into a surrogacy agreement); IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (2020) (stating that it is against 
public policy to enforce surrogacy agreements); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2020) 
(stating that surrogacy agreements are void and unenforceable); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
18-05 (2020) (stating that surrogacy agreements are void). New York recently passed 
legislation lifting its long-time ban on gestational surrogacy. Elizabeth Chuck, New York 
State, Long a Holdout Against Legalizing Surrogacy, Overturns Ban, NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 
2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-york-state-long-holdout-against-
legalizing-surrogacy-overturns-ban-n1176071 [https://perma.cc/DJ3G-Z2FQ]. The 
new law takes effect on February 15, 2021. Id. 
 91 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:2; Casolo et al., supra note 78, at 330-37. 
 92 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:2; Casolo et al., supra note 78, at 335.  
 93 LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2720(B) (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2020); Casolo et al., 
supra note 78, at 334-335 n.202. 
 94 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:2. 
 95 Id. With regard to the substance of the agreement, a few states expressly limit the 
ability of surrogacy contracts to restrict the surrogate’s right to make medical decisions 
during the course of the pregnancy, while a few other states expressly permit the 
inclusion of provisions restricting the surrogate’s rights to engage in activities that may 
harm the fetus. Id. 
 96 See id.; Casolo et al., supra note 78, at 330-37. 
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individuals who may enter into enforceable surrogacy agreements as 
intended parents range from permissive jurisdictions that place no 
marriage- or gender-based restrictions on intended parents to restrictive 
jurisdictions in which eligibility is limited to very narrow categories of 
intended parents.97 In terms of the specific types of eligibility 
restrictions for intended parents, the language of a number of state 
surrogacy statutes restricts eligibility to married intended parents.98 In 
addition, a few jurisdictions restrict eligibility by requiring that gametes 
from at least one of the intended parents be used to conceive the child.99 
Louisiana and North Dakota go even further, requiring that gametes 
from both of the intended parents be used to conceive the child — 
thereby excluding cisgender male same-sex couples from eligibility.100  
Moreover, male same-sex couples also seemingly are excluded from 
entering into enforceable surrogacy agreements in the three 
jurisdictions that require proof that the intended mother (who generally 
would not exist in the context of male same-sex couples) is unable to 
carry a pregnancy altogether or without serious risk to her health or the 
health of the fetus.101 The language of the Arkansas statute governing 
 
 97 The United States Surrogacy Law Map, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS (2016), 
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map/ (last visited Nov. 
11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/C2ZB-H5D7] (describing the laws governing surrogacy 
agreements in every state). 
 98 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:2 (identifying the states as Florida, Louisiana, 
Texas, Utah, and Virginia). 
 99 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.15-16 (2020) (stating that if neither of the 
intended parents is a genetic parent, the surrogate “assume[s] parental rights and 
responsibilities for the child.”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 47/20 (2020) (requiring that at 
least one of the gametes used to conceive the child come from an intended parent); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (2020) (noting that a gestational surrogacy agreement 
is not authorized if neither intended parent provided the gametes used to conceive the 
child). 
 100 LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718.1(6) (2020) (providing that “[i]ntended parents” means 
“a married couple who each exclusively contribute their own gametes to create their 
embryo . . . .”); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01, -05, -08 (2020) (recognizing intended 
parents as legal parents only when the person carrying the child meets the definition of 
a “gestational carrier,” defining the term gestational carrier to require that the embryo 
implanted in the individual be conceived from the ova and sperm of the intended 
parents, and identifying the woman carrying the child and her husband (if he was a 
party to the agreement as the child’s legal parents in all other surrogacy situations)). 
 101 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2720.3 (2020); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 160.756 (2020). The constitutionality of such provisions is questionable. 
In 2019, the Utah Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Obergefell, the provision of the 
surrogacy statute requiring that there be an intended mother who is unable to bear a 
child altogether or without unreasonable risk to the mother or child unconstitutionally 
infringed on the rights of married male same-sex couples. In re Gestational Agreement, 
449 P.3d 69, 80 (Utah 2019). 
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gestational surrogacy also excludes married male same-sex couples, 
albeit through a different mechanism, by declaring that when the 
biological father’s sperm is used to conceive the child, the child’s other 
parent is “the woman intended to be the mother if the biological father 
is married.”102 Due to the various eligibility restrictions within existing 
state surrogacy laws and the lack of surrogacy laws in many states, 
surrogacy laws provide a non-adoptive avenue to establishing parentage 
for male same-sex couples in only a minority of jurisdictions. 
A. Non-Adoptive Legal Recognition of Both the Biological Intended 
Parent and the Non-Biological Intended Parent 
When a different-sex married couple enters into a valid gestational 
surrogacy agreement in which a child is conceived using sperm from 
one member of the couple and ova from a gamete donor, approximately 
eighteen jurisdictions have statutory or appellate case law governing 
surrogacy that explicitly recognizes both spouses as the child’s legal 
parents.103 It is important to note that the statutory language in a few of 
 
Whether the language of the medically-related requirements of a number of other 
states’ statutes excludes male same-sex couples is unclear. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
§ 47/20 (2020) (requiring the intended parent or parents to prove that “he, she, or they 
have a medical need for the gestational surrogacy as evidenced by a qualified physician’s 
affidavit attached to the gestational surrogacy”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2020) 
(requiring a finding that “[t]he intended parent is infertile, is unable to bear a child, or 
is unable to do so without unreasonable risk to the unborn child or to the physical or 
mental health of the intended parent or the child”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §  557.10 (2020) 
(requiring that the court find that “[t]he medical evidence provided shows that the 
intended parent is unable to carry a pregnancy to term and give birth to a child or is 
unable to carry a pregnancy to term and give birth to a child without unreasonable risk 
to the intended parent’s physical or mental health or to the health of the unborn child”). 
 102 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2020). 
 103 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2020); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7606, 7960, 7962 
(2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-36, -48a (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-805, -806, 
-807 (2020); D.C. CODE §§ 16-403, -407 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2020); 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. §§ 47/20, /25 (2020); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1933 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
126.750 (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1, :7 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-
62, -67 (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 557.5, 557.6 (2020); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
160.754 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 803 
(2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.740 (2020); In re 
S.S, 128 A.3d 296, 306-07 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). In addition, Rhode Island and New 
York will join this category of states beginning on January 1, 2021 and February 15, 
2021, respectively. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 581-406 (2020) (effective Feb. 15, 2021); 
Associated Press, Gov Signs Bill Ensuring Parental Rights for Same Sex Couples, 
7NEWSBOSTON (July 21, 2020), https://whdh.com/news/gov-signs-bill-ensuring-
parental-rights-for-same-sex-couples/ [https://perma.cc/3CPX-J9YZ]. One of the Ohio 
intermediate appellate courts (there are twelve, each of which covers a different 
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these states is written in gendered terms that, if applied as written, 
would exclude male same-sex couples.104 As a result, only 
approximately fifteen of the jurisdictions that provide parentage to both 
spouses when a child is conceived using sperm from one of the spouses 
and ova from a donor have laws that do not contain gendered language 
excluding male same-sex couples.105 In these fifteen jurisdictions, both 
members of a married male same-sex couple, the biological intended 
father and the non-biological intended father, can establish legal 
parentage pursuant to the state’s surrogacy law — neither member of 
the couple has to pursue adoption procedures to establish parentage.  
In a number of the jurisdictions with gestational surrogacy laws that 
recognize both intended parents as the child’s legal parents when a child 
is conceived using sperm from one member of the couple and ova from 
a gamete donor, courts can grant pre-birth parentage orders that 
identify the intended parents as the child’s legal parents before the child 
is born.106 Pre-birth orders are an important tool for intended parents. 
Notably, “[o]btaining a judgment prior to the birth of the child removes 
any uncertainty about the respective rights and obligations of the 
parties.”107 As the child’s legal parents, the intended parents generally 
will have immediate access to and custody of the child and control over 
decisions relating to the child’s post-birth care, and the hospital will be 
 
geographical location) held that the gestational surrogacy agreement between an 
unmarried non-biological intended mother and surrogate for the conception of a child 
using donor ova and donor sperm was enforceable and established the intended 
mother’s legal parentage. See S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463, 471-72 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2010). In cases before Ohio courts that are bound by or otherwise follow this decision, 
the non-biological intended mother of a child conceived using donor ova and sperm 
from the intended mother’s husband also likely would be deemed a legal parent. In 
addition, there are reports of trial courts in other jurisdictions providing parentage 
judgments that recognize both spouses as the child’s legal parents in this situation 
despite the lack of any statutory or appellate authority explicitly providing for such 
judgments in the jurisdiction. See Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A 
Constitutional Law Professor’s Musings on Circumventing Washington State’s Criminal 
Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1235, 1245-49 (2014). 
 104 These states include Arkansas, Florida, and Texas. See supra notes 101–02 and 
accompanying text. 
 105 See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.  
 106 There are approximately ten states in which “[s]urrogacy is permitted for all 
parents, pre-birth orders are granted throughout the state, and both parents will be 
named on the birth certificate.” The United States Surrogacy Law Map, supra note 97. 
New York will join this category of states beginning on February 15, 2021. See S. 
Assemb. 7506, 2019–2020 Legis. Sess., N.Y. FAM. CT. § 581-203 (2019). 
 107 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:20. 
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able to discharge the child to the intended parents.108 Pre-birth orders 
also often allow the intended parents to be listed as the child’s legal 
parents on the original birth certificate.109  
In a few of the jurisdictions that recognize both of the intended 
parents as legal parents when a child is conceived using sperm from one 
member of the couple and donor ova, the intended parents must wait 
until the child is born to obtain an order establishing their legal 
parentage.110 A post-birth order may be required in addition to or 
instead of pre-birth judicial approval of the surrogacy agreement.111 On 
the other end of the spectrum, a few states’ gestational surrogacy 
statutes establish legal parentage for intended parents who enter into a 
valid surrogacy agreement without any requirement of judicial 
involvement.112 Even in these jurisdictions, however, experts 
recommend that the intended parents nonetheless obtain a court order 
reflecting their legal parentage.113 This is because “a judgment will 
provide greater assurance that the parties’ legal parentage will be 
recognized by other states and by the federal government,” as even 
courts in jurisdictions that do not recognize surrogacy agreements have 
held that orders from other states establishing parentage in the 
surrogacy context must be given full faith and credit.114 
 
 108 Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage Orders in 
Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 634-35 (2005); Nick Stanley, Comment, 
Freedom of Family: The Right to Enforceable Family Contracts, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. 
LAW. 223, 229 (2018). 
 109 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 108, at 634-35; Stanley, supra note 108, at 229. 
 110 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 4:8, :20 (“In a small number of states that permit 
surrogacy by statute, the legal parentage of the intended parents must be ‘confirmed’ by 
a court after the birth of the child.”). 
 111 Id. § 4:8; Elizabeth J. Samuels, An Immodest Proposal for Birth Registration in 
Donor-Assisted Reproduction in the Interest of Science and Human Rights, 48 N.M. L. REV. 
416, 429 (2018). 
 112 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 47/15 (2020) (stating that when the parties 
have entered into a valid gestational surrogacy agreement, the intended parents are the 
parents of the child for purposes of state law immediately upon the birth of the child); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1933 (2020) (providing that when the parties have 
entered into a valid gestational surrogacy agreement, the intended parent(s) are by 
operation of law the parent(s) of the resulting child immediately upon the birth of the 
child); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“[O]n birth of a child 
conceived by assisted reproduction under a gestational surrogacy agreement, each 
intended parent is, by operation of law, a parent of the child.”). 
 113 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:17. 
 114 Id. 
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B. Non-Adoptive Legal Recognition of Only the Biological Intended 
Parent 
As discussed above, only a minority of states have laws governing 
surrogacy that recognize the parentage of both members of a married 
couple (different- or same-sex) who conceive a child via gestational 
surrogacy using sperm from the biological intended father and donor 
ova.115 In most states that lack such laws, only one of the spouses — the 
biological intended father — can establish parentage through non-
adoptive avenues.116 Specifically, the biological intended father often is 
able to establish parentage through existing procedures for establishing 
paternity that long have been utilized outside of the surrogacy 
context.117 This generally will involve either judicial procedures that 
allow a man to establish paternity based upon proof of a genetic tie to 
the child or voluntary acknowledgement of paternity procedures that 
allow a man to establish paternity by jointly executing a document with 
the birth mother (and, if applicable, her spouse) acknowledging the 
man’s paternity.118  
 
 115 See supra Part II.A. 
 116 See infra note 118 and accompanying text. In some jurisdictions, case law or 
legislative directive makes clear that the non-biological intended parent will need to 
pursue adoption in order to obtain legal parentage. NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2309 
n.239. “In the remaining states without statutory guidance or negative case law, 
adoption would presumably be required because of the operation of the governing 
parentage rules.” Id. 
 117 See infra note 118. 
 118 See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. § 641-99.15(144) (2020) (stating that “[i]f the 
surrogate birth mother is unmarried and the intended father is the sperm donor, the 
unmarried surrogate birth mother and the intended father may complete a Voluntary 
Paternity Affidavit form after the child’s birth . . . .”); In re Paternity and Maternity of 
Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that although state law 
did not recognize the surrogacy agreement, the biological father could establish his 
paternity through existing procedures that allow for the establishment of a man’s 
paternity when there is a joint stipulation that the man is the child’s biological father 
executed by the surrogate, her husband, and the man); A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-
001838-07, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *12 (Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2009) 
(holding that although at the time state law did not recognize the surrogacy agreement 
(New Jersey has since enacted legislation recognizing gestational surrogacy 
agreements), the biological father was a legally recognized parent pursuant to the 
existing state laws governing the establishment of paternity); Arredondo v. Nodelman, 
622 N.Y.S.2d 181, 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (explaining that the biological father was 
able to establish his paternity through a filiation proceeding in which he submitted DNA 
evidence indicating that he was the child’s genetic father); In re Adoption of J., 72 
N.Y.S.3d 811, 812 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018) (holding that although surrogacy agreements 
were void and unenforceable in New York, in order to establish his legal parentage the 
biological intended father nonetheless “could have asked the surrogate to place his 
name on [the child’s] birth certificate, signed an acknowledgment of paternity, 
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Adoption, however, is the only avenue through which the other 
spouse, the non-biological intended parent, can establish parentage in 
these jurisdictions. This is because even when the biological intended 
father is able to establish parentage through existing paternity 
establishment procedures, the law presumes that the individual who 
gave birth to the child is the child’s other legal parent.119 When donor 
ova are used to conceive the child, which is what occurs in the typical 
gestational surrogacy situation involving a male same-sex couple, the 
presumption of legal parentage attaching to the surrogate based upon 
the act of giving birth generally is conclusive and irrefutable, regardless 
of her wishes.120 In most instances, terminating the surrogate’s legal 
parentage will require an adoption procedure in which the surrogate 
agrees to the voluntary termination of her parental rights and the non-
biological intended parent adopts the child.121  
Even if the surrogate is not recognized as a legal parent because, for 
example, the jurisdiction (unlike most) allows for rebuttal of the 
presumed parentage of an individual who gives birth to a child 
conceived using donor ova on genetics-based grounds,122 the non-
biological intended parent within a married male same-sex couple still 
 
registered with the putative father registry, submitted to a deoxyribonucleic acid test, 
or filed a paternity petition”); cf. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (2020) (“A surrogate 
parenthood contract entered into shall be void and unenforceable. The biological father 
of a child born pursuant to such a contract shall have all the rights and obligations 
imposed by law with respect to such child.”); J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1293 
(D. Utah 2002) (stating that although Utah did not enforce surrogacy agreements at the 
time (the law has since changed), the biological intended parents must not be precluded 
from establishing parentage through genetics-based avenues); In re Declaration of 
Parentage and Termination of Parental Rights of Doe, 372 P.3d 1106, 1107 (Idaho 2016) 
(noting that the “Intended Father, Gestational Carrier and Husband, each signed an 
affidavit stating that Intended Father, and not Husband, is the biological father of child 
and should be listed on the birth certificate”). 
 119 See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, 
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 127 (2006) 
(explaining that the law generally bestows parentage to individuals who give birth as “a 
matter of course”). 
 120 See infra note 137 and accompanying text; see also NeJaime, supra note 18, at 
2311. 
 121 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2313 (“Yet, for the nonbiological gay father, the 
surrogate’s gestation — increasingly immaterial where the intended mother is the 
genetic mother — produces legal motherhood and justifies the denial of his parental 
status. Like nonbiological intended mothers in different-sex couples, nonbiological 
intended fathers in same-sex couples cannot claim parentage by virtue of a relationship 
to the biological father. They must, if possible, adopt the child.”). 
 122 See, e.g., In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007) (holding that the surrogate 
could disestablish her maternity on the basis of her lack of genetic connection to the 
child). 
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is left with adoption as the only avenue to establishing legal parentage. 
This is because the surrogacy laws in these jurisdictions do not 
recognize him as a legal parent, the existing paternity establishment 
avenues utilized by his husband, the child’s biological father, are 
unavailable to him as the non-biological intended parent, and marriage-
based parentage establishment avenues stem only from marriage to the 
individual who gave birth.123 Notably, in these jurisdictions, the same 
result occurs for married different-sex couples who conceive children 
via gestational surrogacy using sperm from the biological intended 
father and donor ova — the non-biological intended mother cannot 
establish parentage through surrogacy-, genetics-, or marriage-based 
avenues, leaving adoption as the only option. 
C. Adoptive Legal Recognition of Both Intended Parents 
In a few states, both members of a married male same-sex couple may 
have to pursue adoption in order to establish themselves as the legal 
parents of a child born through gestational surrogacy using sperm from 
one member of the couple and donor ova. For example, the law 
governing surrogacy in North Dakota provides that unless the embryo 
was conceived using the ova and sperm of the intended parents, “the 
surrogate is the mother of a resulting child and the surrogate’s husband, 
if a party to the agreement, is the father of the child.”124 Similarly, in 
other states in which the provision of legal parentage based upon the 
act of giving birth is conclusive and irrefutable, if the surrogate is 
married and the state’s marital presumption of parentage applies to her 
spouse, both intended parents may have to pursue adoption to establish 
 
 123 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2314 (“Ultimately, male same-sex couples are 
excluded by a parentage regime that grounds parenthood in biological connection 
outside marriage and derives nonbiological parenthood inside marriage only from 
marriage to a biological mother.”); supra Part I.C. 
 124 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2020). North Dakota distinguishes between 
“gestational carriers” and “surrogates.” Id. § 14-18-01. North Dakota defines a 
gestational carrier as “an adult woman who enters into an agreement to have an embryo 
implanted in her and bear the resulting child for intended parents, where the embryo is 
conceived by using the egg and sperm of the intended parents.” Id. The requirement 
that the embryo be conceived using the egg and sperm of the intended parents excludes 
surrogacy agreements involving intended parents who are cisgender male same-sex 
couples. North Dakota defines a surrogate as “an adult woman who enters into an 
agreement to bear a child conceived through assisted conception for intended parents.” 
Id. Consequently, the person carrying the child pursuant to an agreement with a male 
same-sex couple would fall under the definition of surrogate, as opposed to gestational 
carrier. While a child born to a gestational carrier is the child of the legal parents, a 
child born to a surrogate is the child of the surrogate and her husband (if he was a party 
to the agreement). Id. §§ 14-18-05, -08. 
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legal parentage if the parties are unable to rebut the marital 
presumption.125 In these situations, the consent of the surrogate and her 
spouse to the relinquishment of their parental rights and the adoption 
of the child by the intended parents generally would be required as part 
of the adoption procedures.126 
III. THE BARRIERS TO EXTENDING NON-ADOPTIVE MARRIAGE-BASED 
PARENTAGE ESTABLISHMENT AVENUES TO MALE SAME-SEX COUPLES 
Both male and female same-sex couples have long faced inequitable 
treatment under the laws governing parentage, which often have served 
to make the establishment of legal parentage significantly more 
burdensome (if not impossible) for same-sex couples as compared to 
their different-sex counterparts. This inequitable treatment likely stems 
from societal homophobia and heteronormativity, as well as the 
lingering perception that genetic connections are essential to 
identifying who is entitled to recognition as a child’s legal parents.127 
Although in recent years parentage law has made significant strides in 
its treatment of female same-sex couples by extending non-adoptive 
marriage-based parentage establishment avenues to the same-sex 
spouses of individuals who give birth, male same-sex couples continue 
to be excluded from these important avenues to establishing parentage. 
The barriers that are unique to male same-sex couples in gaining access 
to non-adoptive methods of establishing parentage are tied, in large 
part, to both the significance that parentage law long has placed on the 
 
 125 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-218(B), (C) (2020) (“A surrogate is the legal 
mother of a child born as a result of a surrogate parentage contract and is entitled to 
custody of that child . . . . If the mother of a child born as a result of a surrogate contract 
is married, her husband is presumed to be the legal father of the child.”); JOSLIN ET AL., 
supra note 11, § 4:20 (“[E]ven in situations in which one of the intended parents is a 
genetic contributor, there may be circumstances under which that person is not 
recognized as a legal parent of a child born through surrogacy . . . . [T]his may be the 
result in states without statutes specifically governing the legal parentage of children 
born through surrogacy.”); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital 
Presumption Post-Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 663, 671 (2016) (“[S]ome states, such as 
Michigan, may also recognize the birth mother’s husband as a legal parent and make it 
relatively difficult to rebut the marital presumption.”). Around two-thirds of states 
allow biological fathers who conceive children with a woman who is married to 
someone else to bring actions seeking to rebut the marital presumption. Feinberg, 
Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 38, at 252. Courts may deny rebuttal despite proof 
that the putative father, and not the birth mother’s husband, is the child’s biological 
father if it is determined that rebuttal would be contrary to the best interests of the child. 
Id. at 252-53.  
 126 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:20. 
 127 See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 102 n.7.  
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act of giving birth and the deeply engrained, lingering societal views 
regarding the roles of women and men in raising children.128 
A. The Law’s Provision of Legal Parentage Based Upon the Act of Giving 
Birth 
The law long has provided legal parentage to individuals who give 
birth “as a matter of course.”129 For most of the nation’s history, the 
automatic provision of legal parentage based upon the act of giving birth 
went largely unchallenged.130 This is almost certainly due in large part 
to the fact that, until recent advancements in medical technology 
leading to the availability of in vitro fertilization, the person who gave 
birth necessarily was the child’s genetic parent.131 Today, of course, it is 
no longer true that the person who gives birth to the child necessarily 
shares a genetic connection with the child. As a result of the 
advancements in reproductive technology that have allowed for the 
disentanglement of gestation and genetics, the law has had to “to 
confront issues in determining maternity for the first time in history.”132 
At present, the only scenario in which a presumption of legal 
parentage does not attach to the act of giving birth is when state law 
recognizes a surrogacy agreement as establishing the intended parents 
as the child’s sole legal parents prior to or upon the child’s birth. In the 
absence of an enforceable surrogacy agreement, the law widely 
continues to presume legal parentage based upon the act of giving 
 
 128 I agree with Professor Susan Appleton that it is correct to regard “as gender-based 
an approach that excludes all gay male couples from the easy and beneficial default rule 
and makes them instead navigate more onerous and intrusive hurdles, even if some 
traditional and lesbian couples occasionally face such hurdles as well.” Appleton, supra 
note 44, at 268.  
 129 Meyer, supra note 119, at 127. 
 130 See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to 
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 912 (2000) (“Because 
pregnancy and birth are relatively public and undisputed, the law has rarely confronted 
the question of legal motherhood at all.”). 
 131 See Lauren Springett, Why the Intent Test Falls Short: Examining the Ways in Which 
the Legal System Devalues Gestation to Promote Nuclear Families, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 391, 396 (2019) (“The law privileged the mother-child relationship on the 
assumption that birthing a child and having a genetic relationship with that child went 
hand in hand.”); The History of Surrogacy, MODERN FAMILY SURROGACY CTR., 
http://www.modernfamilysurrogacy.com/page/surrogacy_history (last visited Aug. 30, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/ZAJ3-672B] (explaining that the first gestational surrogacy 
arrangement occurred in 1985). 
 132 J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 
345, 395 n.397 (2011). 
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birth.133 However, judicial decisions in a number of jurisdictions have 
provided for the rebuttal and disestablishment of the presumed legal 
parentage that attaches to the individual who gave birth, despite the 
unenforceability of the surrogacy agreement, when there is a genetic 
intended mother seeking to establish maternity.134 The courts in these 
cases have held that genetics-based avenues similar to those that exist 
in the paternity establishment context can be utilized to establish the 
intended mother’s maternity and to rebut and disestablish the 
surrogate’s maternity.135 Specifically, the intended mother’s maternity 
can be established and the surrogate’s maternity can be rebutted and 
disestablished based upon proof that the intended mother’s ova were 
used to conceive the child, i.e., proof that the intended mother is also 
the genetic mother.136 However, the ability to rebut and disestablish the 
maternity of the person who gave birth through genetics-based avenues 
generally has been restricted to surrogacy arrangements that involve a 
genetic intended mother.137  
 
 133 NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2300. 
 134 See, e.g., J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002) (concluding that the 
presumption that the individual who gave birth is a legal parent cannot lawfully be given 
preclusive or conclusive effect in the light of evidence that the intended parents are the 
child’s genetic parents); Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) 
(finding a state statute, which declared the individual who gave birth to the child to be 
the legal mother, unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); In re Paternity & 
Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that “that the 
paternity statutes provide a procedural template to challenge the putative relationship 
between the [surrogate and child]”); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 
N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2001) (holding that the intended parents, who were the “sole 
genetic sources of the twins[,]” were the children’s lawful parents); A.H.W. v. G.H.B, 
772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that the original birth certificate of a child 
born to a surrogate could identify the intended parents whose genetic materials were 
used to conceive the child as the child’s parents); T.V. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 929 
N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (holding that the lower court “erred in finding that 
it did not have the authority to issue an order of maternity to the Genetic Mother . . . 
.”); Doe v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d 180 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that 
the intended mother was entitled to a declaration of maternity because she established 
to a reasonable degree of certainty that she was the genetic mother); Arredondo v. 
Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that the genetic mother, 
and not the surrogate, was the legal mother of the child to whom the surrogate gave 
birth). 
 135 See supra note 134. 
 136 See supra note 134. 
 137 See, e.g., In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2013) (holding that the gestational surrogate could not disestablish maternity because 
biological maternity had not been established in another woman); In re Parentage of a 
Child by T.J.S. & A.L.S., 54 A.3d 263 (N.J. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that the 
gestational surrogate, and not the non-biological intended mother, was the legal parent 
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Restricting genetics-based rebuttal of the presumed parentage that 
attaches based upon the act of giving birth to surrogacy arrangements 
involving a genetic intended mother means that the legal parentage of 
the surrogate, who has no genetic connection to the child herself, often 
hinges on the source of the ova used to create the embryo. A pair of 
cases from Indiana is illustrative. In In re Infant R., the Court of Appeals 
of Indiana ruled on the legal parentage of a child born through 
gestational surrogacy using the genetic materials of both the intended 
mother and the intended father.138 Although surrogacy contracts are 
unenforceable under Indiana law,139 the court held that, based upon 
principles of equity, the maternity of the intended mother could be 
established and the maternity of the surrogate disestablished based 
upon clear and convincing evidence of the intended mother’s genetic 
connection to the child.140 The court explained that “the [state’s] 
paternity statutes provide a procedural template to challenge the 
putative relationship between the infant and [the gestational 
surrogate].”141 Three years later, in In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant 
T., the same court ruled on the legal parentage of a child born through 
gestational surrogacy using sperm from the intended father and donor 
ova.142 The intended father, the surrogate, and the surrogate’s husband 
jointly sought to disestablish the surrogate’s maternity,143 and the 
intended father’s wife planned to subsequently pursue legal parentage 
through the only avenue available to her, adoption.144 The court denied 
the parties’ request to disestablish the maternity of the gestational 
surrogate, holding that the “presumptive relationship [between the 
 
of a child conceived using donor ova because maternity requires a gestational or genetic 
connection to the child); A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, 2009 N.J. Super. 
Unpub. LEXIS 3250 (Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2009) (holding, in a case in which the intended 
parents were a male same-sex couple, that the gestational surrogate’s maternity could 
not be disestablished and noting that it was not a situation in which a court had to 
“break a tie” between a gestational mother and a genetic mother); see also NeJaime, 
supra note 18, at 2326 (“Yet in most states, the surrogate’s nonrecognition occurs only 
when the intended mother is the genetic mother.”); supra note 134 (discussing cases in 
which the surrogate’s maternity was disestablished). But see In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 
115, 130-31 (Md. 2007) (holding that the surrogate’s maternity could be disestablished 
through a genetics-based avenue despite the lack of a genetic intended mother). 
 138 In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d at 60. 
 139 IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (2020). 
 140 In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d at 61-62. 
 141 Id. at 62. 
 142 In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d at 597. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See id. at 598 n.2. 
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surrogate and child] will stand unless another woman establishes that 
she is, in fact, the biological mother of the child.”145  
These decisions reflect the modern trend in maternity determinations 
involving gestational surrogacy agreements that the jurisdiction does 
not recognize as enforceable. Namely, a conclusive presumption of legal 
parentage attaches to the surrogate when donor ova are used to conceive 
the child, but when ova from the intended mother are used, the 
presumption of legal parentage that attaches to the surrogate can be 
rebutted and disestablished on genetics-based grounds.146 The result is 
that a surrogate is not a legal parent when ova from the intended mother 
are used in conception, but is a legal parent when donor ova are used 
in conception. When male same-sex couples seek to become parents via 
gestational surrogacy, generally donor ova are used in conception and 
no genetic intended mother exists. This means that in the typical 
situation involving a male same-sex couple who has entered into a 
surrogacy agreement that the relevant jurisdiction does not recognize 
as enforceable, the presumption of legal parentage that attaches to the 
surrogate is conclusive — it cannot be rebutted and disestablished 
through genetics-based avenues. 
The conclusive presumption of legal parentage that attaches to the 
individual who gave birth when there is no genetic intended mother 
poses a significant barrier to extending marriage-based avenues of 
establishing parentage to male same-sex couples who conceive children 
via surrogacy. First, since the person who gives birth automatically 
attains the conclusive status of the child’s legal parent and most United 
States jurisdictions recognize a maximum of two legal parents, it follows 
that marriage-based presumptions of parentage logically would stem 
only from the person who gave birth.147 If marriage-based presumptions 
of parentage stemmed from anyone other than the person who gave 
birth, such as the child’s biological father, then the state would be 
opening the door for the simultaneous establishment of legal parentage 
in more than two individuals. In situations in which the biological 
father was married to someone other than the person who gave birth, 
application of a marriage-based parentage presumption to the biological 
father’s spouse would result in the concurrent establishment of legal 
parentage in, at a minimum, the individual who gave birth, the 
 
 145 Id. at 601. 
 146 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2311. 
 147 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 134 (“[T]he law in the vast 
majority of states recognizes a maximum of two legal parents for each child.”). 
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biological father, and the biological father’s spouse.148 Consequently, 
the conclusive presumption of legal parentage that attaches to 
individuals who give birth in the absence of a genetic intended mother 
and the limit of two legal parents in most states result in a situation 
where marriage-based parentage presumptions can flow only from the 
person who gave birth. 
In addition, as long as the presumption of legal parentage based upon 
the act of giving birth is conclusive in the absence of a genetic intended 
mother, generally rendering the surrogate a legal parent in surrogacy 
arrangements involving male same-sex couples, adoption proceedings 
will remain a necessary step for establishing the legal parentage of the 
non-biological intended parent. Since most jurisdictions recognize a 
maximum of two legal parents, before the non-biological intended 
parent can establish legal parentage, the surrogate’s parental rights will 
need to be terminated.149 Termination of a legal parent’s rights requires 
a judicial proceeding.150 Unless the surrogate is deemed an unfit parent, 
she will need to agree to the voluntary termination of her parental 
rights,151 and there are very limited circumstances under which a legal 
parent can voluntarily terminate their parental rights.152 Generally, this 
may only occur in the context of an adoption proceeding wherein 
someone else is seeking to assume the parental status occupied by the 
parent whose rights are being terminated.153 As a result, the conclusive 
presumption of legal parentage based upon the act of giving birth not 
only makes the extension of marriage-based avenues of establishing 
parentage to male same-sex couples untenable in jurisdictions that 
recognize a maximum of two legal parents, but it also confines 
 
 148 If the individual who gave birth was married, a presumption of legal parentage 
could also attach to their spouse. 
 149 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 150 See 2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES 
§ 13:21 (2020) (“An action for termination of parental rights or an adoption must still 
be filed in order for the parent’s rights to be terminated.”). 
 151 See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 119-21. 
 152 See id. at 120-21. 
 153 M. ELAINE BUCCIERI, JAMES BUCHWALTER, CECILY FUHR, STEPHEN LEASE, KARL 
OAKES, & ERIC C. SURETTE, 43 C.J.S. INFANTS § 24 (2020) (“There is authority that a 
parent may not voluntarily surrender his or her parental rights to a child in a context 
other than the adoption of the child.”); Krista Sirola, Are You My Mother? Defending the 
Rights of Intended Parents in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & LAW 131, 139-40 (2006) (“Neither mothers nor fathers can 
relinquish their parental rights voluntarily unless another intends to assume those 
rights by adoption.”).  
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parentage establishment for male same-sex couples to the adoption 
realm. 
B. Gender-Based Stereotypes, Beliefs, and Assumptions in the Parentage 
Context 
The failure to extend marriage-based avenues of parentage 
establishment to male same-sex couples also likely stems from societal 
beliefs about the differing roles of women and men;154 these beliefs have 
both influenced, and been influenced by, the law. For most of the 
nation’s history, the law has perpetuated and reinforced the belief that 
men and women should have different familial roles, with women 
responsible for the care of the home and children, and men responsible 
for providing the household’s “[financial] support and its links to 
external society.”155 For example, early laws, inter alia, required married 
men to support their wives financially and married women to care for 
the children and home,156 denied married women the right to hold 
property or control any wages that they earned,157 capped the number 
of hours women could work,158 and provided no protection against sex-
based discrimination in the workplace.159 Until the 1970s, when the 
Supreme Court began to interpret the Equal Protection Clause to 
require heightened scrutiny for laws that made classifications on the 
basis of sex, “sex-based classifications in family and employment law 
 
 154 See David Fontana & Naomi Schoenbaum, Unsexing Pregnancy, 119 COLUM. L. 
REV. 309, 350 (2019) (discussing the view that “gay-male couples are inadequate 
parents, not only because of their sexual orientation, but also because their family is 
missing an appropriate caregiver — a woman”); NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2330 (“Gay 
men engaging in surrogacy challenge the centrality of the mother-child relationship in 
ways that different-sex couples engaging in surrogacy do not.”) (citing GERALD P. 
MALLON, GAY MEN CHOOSING PARENTHOOD 99 (2004)). 
 155 DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CAHN, CATHERINE J. ROSS, DAVID D. MEYER & LINDA 
C. MCCLAIN, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 169 (4th ed. 2015); see also Fontana & 
Schoenbaum, supra note 154, at 316 (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women 
Becoming Part of Constitution, 6 L. & INEQ. 17, 19 (1988)). 
 156 Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 213 (2007). 
 157 A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to 
Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
69, 76-77 (1998); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United 
States as a Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 269 (1997). 
 158 Ginsburg, supra note 157, at 269 (citing Muller v. Oregon, 2018 U.S. 412 (1908)). 
 159 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first federal law to prohibit 
employment discrimination on the basis of sex. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 155, at 169. 
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aligned with gender norms to enforce an ideology of separate spheres 
for men and women.”160  
With regard to laws governing parental rights specifically, historically 
these laws have reflected gendered beliefs and assumptions about the 
parental and caretaking capabilities of women and men. For example, 
in the context of custody disputes between mothers and fathers, by the 
late nineteenth century, many states began to employ the tender years 
doctrine, which required that mothers receive custody of children 
under a certain age.161 This doctrine stemmed from the belief that only 
mothers could properly nurture young children.162 It was not until the 
1970s that courts started to strike down state custody laws employing 
the tender years doctrine based upon “emerging constitutional law 
concerning gender equality.”163 Moreover, it was not until 1972 that the 
Supreme Court, in Stanley v. Illinois, struck down as unconstitutional 
state laws that set forth a conclusive presumption that all unmarried 
biological fathers were “unsuitable and neglectful parents” who were 
unfit to care for their children, and left children of unmarried fathers 
wards of the state when their mother, due to death or other 
circumstances, was unable to care for them.164 
Although parentage law began moving towards greater gender 
equality in the 1970s and 1980s, the law continued to reflect gendered 
beliefs about the parental roles and caretaking capabilities of women 
and men by providing biological fathers who were not married to the 
child’s mother with fewer rights and protections than any other category 
of biological parents. Following Stanley, a series of cases decided by the 
Supreme Court established the “biology plus” standard for determining 
whether a biological father who is not married to the child’s mother 
shares a constitutionally protected relationship with the child.165 Under 
 
 160 Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 721 
(2012). 
 161 ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 155, at 803. 
 162 See id. 
 163 Id. Today, while custody laws do not explicitly set forth gender-based 
preferences, and many states have statutory provisions stating that the court may not 
give preference to one parent over the other on the basis of gender, many people argue 
that gender stereotypes continue to pervade custody decisions. See Jessica Feinberg, 
Consideration of Genetic Connections in Child Custody Disputes Between Same-Sex Parents: 
Fair or Foul?, 81 MO. L. REV. 331, 357 (2016). 
 164 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654, 656-57 (1972). 
 165 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983) (finding a biological 
connection plus acceptance of parental responsibility to be sufficient for constitutional 
protection); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979) (holding a substantial 
parent-child relationship should lead to ease in identifying the father even if the child 
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this standard, the biological father establishes a constitutionally 
protected parent-child relationship only if he “grasps the opportunity” 
to develop a relationship with his child and “demonstrates a full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by com[ing] forward 
to participate in the rearing of his child.”166 While the biology plus 
standard provided significantly greater protections for biological fathers 
who are not married to the child’s mother than they had previously 
enjoyed, it is notable that no other categories of biological parents need 
to make this type of showing in order to receive constitutional 
protection for the parent-child relationship. With regard to biological 
mothers, whether married or unmarried, “all of the [Supreme Court’s] 
fatherhood cases assumed that the birth of a child establishes the 
mother’s rights.”167 In terms of biological fathers who are married to the 
child’s mother, the Supreme Court has suggested that they enjoy greater 
constitutional protections than unmarried fathers.168 The Court has 
indicated that if the biology plus standard applies to married biological 
fathers,169 they may be presumed to have satisfied the standard by virtue 
of having shared an intact marital relationship and familial home with 
the mother and child for a period of time.170  
 
is born out of wedlock); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (failing to 
recognize a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship due to the father’s 
failure to take significant responsibility of the child). 
 166 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 167 Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 
441 (2007); see also Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers 
Abroad and at Home, 36 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 405, 436 (2013) (stating that in Lehr, “the 
only relevant criterion for the mother was, by default, the fact that she gave birth to her 
child; just the father had to supplement the fact of biology with the establishment of a 
perceptible relationship”). 
 168 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16 (stating that although “[i]n some circumstances the 
actual relationship between father and child may suffice to create in the unwed father 
parental interests comparable to those of the married father . . . the absence of a legal 
tie with the mother may . . . appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive 
constitutional claims might otherwise exist by virtue of the father’s actual relationship 
with the children” (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
 169 Jennifer S. Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism: The Case Against Genetic Entitlement, 
91 TUL. L. REV. 473, 505 n.126 (2017) (“The Supreme Court, however, has suggested 
that the biology-plus-relationship may apply to all fathers.”) (emphasis added). 
 170 See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256 (referring to a “married father who is separated or 
divorced from the mother and is no longer living with his child” and stating that “even 
a father whose marriage has broken apart will have borne full responsibility for the 
rearing of his children during the period of the marriage”); see also Nancy E. Dowd, 
Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 
1271, 1307 (2005) (“The strong protection of marital fathers seems presumed within 
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Notably, after the Stanley line of cases, a subsequent Supreme Court 
decision established that for biological fathers who are not married to 
the child’s mother, even satisfaction of the biology plus standard does 
not guarantee constitutional protection for the parent-child relationship 
when there is a competing claim of parentage from a man who is 
married to the child’s mother.171 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme 
Court addressed a biological father’s claim that it was unconstitutional 
for California to categorically deny biological fathers standing to 
challenge the marital presumption.172 The plurality opinion, in 
determining that the biological father’s constitutional rights had not 
been violated, set forth the proposition that the constitutional 
protections afforded to unmarried biological fathers who satisfy the 
biology plus standard do not extend to a man who fathers a child with 
a woman who is married to another man.173 Consequently, although the 
biological father had formed a relationship with the child that satisfied 
the biology plus standard, it was constitutional to establish the husband 
of the child’s mother as the legal father on the basis of his marriage to 
the child’s mother.174 
The different avenues available today for establishing paternity 
depending on the man’s relationship to the child’s mother further 
illuminate parentage law’s continued adherence to gender-based 
stereotypes and assumptions.175 As discussed above, in terms of married 
men, every state employs a presumption that the husband of the woman 
who gave birth is the child’s legal parent.176 For a man who wishes to 
establish his legal parentage but is not married to the child’s birth 
mother, the most efficient, simple, and inexpensive method of doing so 
is through a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (“VAP”) executed 
jointly with the child’s mother (often at the hospital immediately 
following the child’s birth).177 Federal law mandates that VAPs be 
offered by all birthing hospitals and birth records offices,178 and after 
 
decisions protecting family privacy that especially accord a high value to marriage, as 
well as decisions upholding parental rights against state intrusion.”). 
 171 See infra notes 173–74 and accompanying text. 
 172 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989). 
 173 Id. at 123-24. 
 174 Id. at 129-30. 
 175 See Appleton, supra note 44, at 282-83 (“Still, fatherhood remains, in significant 
part, a ‘secondary’ or derivative relationship that requires an initial determination of the 
child’s first or ‘primary’ parent, the mother.”). 
 176 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 106 n.27. 
 178 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(1) (2020). 
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sixty days the VAP must be considered “a legal finding of paternity.”179 
Importantly, men cannot establish parentage through VAPs without the 
birth mother’s express, written consent.180 It is also noteworthy that 
neither marital presumption standards nor VAP procedures require the 
man to prove that he is genetically connected to the child in order to 
establish his legal parentage.181 
If a biological father is not married to the child’s birth mother and the 
birth mother is unwilling to execute a VAP, he must pursue legal 
proceedings to establish parentage based upon his biological connection 
to the child.182 Moreover, if the mother is married to someone else and 
does not wish for the biological father to establish parentage, the 
biological father must bring a legal action to challenge the marital 
presumption of parentage that applies to the mother’s husband.183 
Although a majority of states now grant biological fathers standing to 
challenge the marital presumption, proof of a genetic connection to the 
child does not guarantee that the biological father will be able to 
establish legal paternity.184 Courts may deny rebuttal of the marital 
presumption when it is deemed contrary to equitable principles or the 
best interests of the child, and many states place time restrictions on 
actions to challenge the marital presumption.185 
Basically, the law continues to make it significantly easier for men, 
regardless of their biological connection to the child, to establish legal 
parentage when they are, or are perceived to be, undertaking parentage 
with the involvement of the child’s birth mother.186 If a man is married 
to the child’s birth mother, which is likely perceived as the strongest 
guarantee that the birth mother will be significantly involved in any 
 
 179 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii) (2018). 
 180 See Hendricks, supra note 169, at 517. 
 181 See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 127; supra Part I.A. 
 182 Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent?, supra note 4, at 85. 
 183 In some states, the biological father’s paternity can be established through the 
VAP even if the birth mother is married to someone else. This usually involves the birth 
mother, her husband, and the biological father together executing the VAP. Feinberg, 
A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 128-29 n.158. This, of course, requires the birth 
mother’s consent. See id. 
 184 Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 38, at 252-54. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See Appleton, supra note 44, at 282 (“[F]atherhood has long been constructed as 
a status stemming from a man’s legally recognized relationship to a child’s mother. 
Although the required legal relationship to the mother often coincides with a genetic 
relationship to the child, traditionally the genetic relationship was neither necessary nor 
sufficient to trigger legal paternity.”); see also Hendricks, supra note 169, at 517 (“The 
VAP process thus substitutes for marriage by allowing for the creation of a coparenting 
relationship by mutual consent.”). 
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caretaking the man undertakes, he does not have to take any steps at all 
to establish parentage.187 If a man is not married to the birth mother but 
she consents to his establishment of parentage, which is likely perceived 
as the next best indication that the birth mother will be involved in the 
caretaking undertaken by the man, the man merely has to execute a 
document to establish parentage.188 However, if the man does not share 
a marital or cooperative relationship with the birth mother, which is 
likely perceived as a strong indication that the caretaking he undertakes 
will not occur in the presence of the birth mother, he must pursue legal 
proceedings to establish his parentage and prove that he is the child’s 
biological father.189 Even if a man is able to prove a biological tie to the 
child, that may not be enough to establish his parentage. As the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Michael H. demonstrated, parentage claims 
stemming from a man’s marriage to the child’s birth mother may 
outweigh parentage claims stemming from a man’s biological and social 
connections to the child.190  
The differing standards for parentage establishment for men who are 
perceived to be part of a parenting unit with the child’s biological 
mother, as opposed to those who are not, likely stem, at least in part, 
from the lingering discomfort about the ability (or lack thereof) of men 
to care for children without the presence of the biological mother. 
While the desire to provide children with a “unitary family” certainly is 
part of the reason for encouraging the establishment of parentage in 
men who are married to or in a relationship with the child’s biological 
mother,191 the preference for raising children within unitary families 
cannot be the only reason that the law is structured in this manner. This 
becomes clear when one considers that the promotion of the unitary 
family through the laws governing parentage establishment only works 
in one direction. Specifically, if the biological mother is part of a unitary 
family, the law promotes the establishment of parentage in her spouse 
or partner.192 Conversely, if the biological father is part of a unitary 
family, the law does not promote the establishment of parentage in his 
spouse or partner — even if the biological father is the only biological 
 
 187 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 188 See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. 
 189 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 190 See Dowd, supra note 170, at 1305-06 (“Marital fatherhood, even when 
nonbiological, is clearly preferred by the Court . . . .”). 
 191 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3 (1989). 
 192 See supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text. 
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parent who would provide the child with a unitary family.193 The 
differing standards for paternity establishment based upon a man’s 
relationship to the child’s biological mother reflect the gendered belief 
that men cannot or will not provide adequate caregiving without the 
presence and involvement of the biological mother. Overall, while many 
of the laws that explicitly employed sex-based stereotypes have been 
struck down over the years, parentage law continues to reflect gender-
related assumptions in more subtle ways.194 
It is perhaps then unsurprising that the belief that it is essential for 
children to have a mother present and serving as the primary caretaker, 
a belief which the law long promoted and reinforced, remains prevalent 
in modern society.195 Polls conducted in recent years by the Pew 
Research Center highlight that large segments of society maintain 
gendered beliefs about parenting. For example, while 51% of 
respondents in a recent poll stated that they believed children were 
better off when their mother was a stay-at-home mother who did not 
work outside the home, only 8% of respondents held the same belief 
about fathers.196 When the question focused on parents of young 
children, 80% of respondents stated that the ideal situation for mothers 
with young children was that they either work part-time or not at all, 
while only 24% of respondents felt the same way about fathers with 
young children.197 This recent research regarding societal views of 
parenting roles indicates that the presence of a mother in a primary 
caretaking role is still viewed by a large segment of society as essential 
to children’s development, and that this belief does not extend to 
fathers.  
 
 193 Parentage establishment through marriage-based presumptions of parentage and 
VAPs stems from an individual’s relationship to the person who gave birth as opposed 
to an individual’s relationship to the child’s biological father. See supra notes 37, 67, 
177–80 and accompanying text. 
 194 See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 170, at 1280-90 (discussing immigration law decisions 
that reflect gender-based assumptions around parentage). 
 195 See id. at 1271 (“[S]tereotypes of fathers run deep despite changing constitutional 
norms.”); Widiss, supra note 160, at 739 (“The reforms of the 1970s eliminated the role 
that sex-based classifications played in enforcing the traditional gendered divide. It was 
expected that these changes would in turn transform the gendered ideology that 
underlay them. This has proven an elusive goal.”). 
 196 WENDY WANG, KIM PARKER & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., BREADWINNER 
MOMS 2-3 (2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/ 
05/Breadwinner_moms_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q3ZW-W6EL]. 
 197 KIM PARKER & WENDY WANG, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD app. 4 at 
58 (2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/03/modern_ 
parenthood_topline_03-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/23CJ-66VW]. 
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The gendered societal beliefs that persist in the parentage context 
stem from a number of common assumptions, stereotypes, and 
generalizations about the differing parental and caretaking dispositions, 
capabilities, and practices of women and men.198 As an initial matter, 
there is the persistent assumption that fathers cannot or will not be as 
caring or nurturing as mothers.199 Similarly, another lingering 
assumption is that men cannot or will not form as strong of bonds with 
their children as women.200 Other persistent stereotypes are that women 
are more responsible parents than men and are more capable than men 
at performing the tasks involved in day-to-day caregiving.201 Indeed, in 
several studies, stay-at-home fathers were viewed as less competent 
caregivers than stay-at-home mothers.202 In addition to the stereotypes 
and assumptions about men in general, there are also stereotypes more 
specific to gay men that cast a negative light on their caretaking abilities, 
including that they are “anti-family”203 and have commitment issues.204 
 
 198 See Dowd, supra note 170, at 1272 (describing “a deep negative societal bias 
about men’s caregiving”). 
 199 See ABBIE E. GOLDBERG, GAY DADS: TRANSITIONS TO ADOPTIVE FATHERHOOD 12 
(2012) (citation omitted) (“Women as mothers are presumed to be nurturing, caring, 
and self-sacrificing, whereas men as fathers are presumed to be more practical, less 
emotional, and strongly committed to paid employment.”); Dowd, supra note 170, at 
1284 (“This idea is grounded in a stereotype that men, or most men, will not nurture 
children.”). 
 200 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I believe 
that a State is fully justified in concluding, on the basis of common human experience, 
that the biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger 
bonds between her and the child than the bonds resulting from the male’s often casual 
encounter.”); see also Abigail Millings, Angela Rowe & Judi Walsh, Do Mothers Really 
Have Stronger Bonds with Their Children than Fathers Do?, CONVERSATION (Apr. 20, 2016, 
5:40 AM EDT), http://theconversation.com/do-mothers-really-have-stronger-bonds-
with-their-children-than-fathers-do-57590 [http://perma.cc/5MAM-W9AG]. 
 201 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 666 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Centuries of human 
experience buttress this view of the realities of human conditions and suggest that 
unwed mothers of illegitimate children are generally more dependable protectors of 
their children than are unwed fathers.”); id. at 654 (majority opinion) (“It may be, as 
the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents.”); 
Dowd, supra note 170, at 1275 (describing “outdated stereotypes about men as 
incapable, incompetent caregivers”). 
 202 Ruth Gaunt, Breadwinning Moms, Caregiving Dads: Double Standard in Social 
Judgments of Gender Norm Violators, 34 J. FAM. ISSUES 3, 6, 9-10 (2013). 
 203 Dana Berkowitz, A Sociohistorical Analysis of Gay Men’s Procreative Consciousness, 
in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTING: NEW DIRECTIONS 157, 159 (Fiona Tasker & Jerry J. 
Bigner eds., 2007). 
 204 See E. Gary Spitko, From Queer to Paternity: How Primary Gay Fathers Are 
Changing Fatherhood and Gay Identity, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 195, 207 (2005). 
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Laws that exclude male same-sex couples from establishing both 
members as legal parents through non-adoptive avenues directly reflect 
the persistent gendered beliefs, assumptions, and stereotypes that 
continue to exist around parenting and caretaking.205 For example, laws 
that provide parentage based upon the act of giving birth and set forth 
marriage-based presumptions stemming only from the person who 
gives birth reflect the view that identifying the biological mother as the 
child’s first legal parent is the critical initial step that parentage law must 
undertake.206 While marriage-based presumptions of parentage have 
been extended to encompass both male and female spouses of women 
who give birth, i.e., situations in which it is guaranteed that at least one 
of the child’s two legal parents will be a woman who is biologically 
connected to the child — they have not been extended to the spouses 
of biological fathers.207 In addition, laws that maintain parentage in the 
woman who gives birth unless there is a genetic intended mother or, in 
some jurisdictions, simply an intended mother for whom pregnancy 
carries substantial risks, reflect the view that providing children with at 
least one legal parent who is a woman is essential. These laws 
demonstrate that while it is not always essential to provide parentage to 
the woman who gives birth, it is essential to establish legal parentage in 
at least one individual who can be identified as a “mother,” a term which 
is construed narrowly in some of these jurisdictions as a woman who is 
biologically or genetically connected to the child, and more broadly in 
others as a woman who intends to raise the child but for whom 
pregnancy carries substantial risks.208 In sum, the law governing 
parentage establishment for male same-sex couples, which reflects 
problematic gender-based stereotypes, beliefs, and assumptions, is in 
critical need of reform.  
 
 205 See Appleton, supra note 44, at 292 (“Aside from the practical difficulties, the 
different treatment marginalizes male couples and sends a signal that nurturing and 
parenting do not come ‘naturally’ to gay men.”). 
 206 Adler, supra note 79, at 18 (“Pavan grounds the second parent’s rights in marriage 
to the birth mother, whose rights go entirely unquestioned; birth mother rights serve as 
a premise rather than a conclusion. A married gay male couple cannot possibly be 
treated the same as a married heterosexual or lesbian couple unless and until the law 
dispenses with that remarkably durable — if barely visible — starting place.”); 
Appleton, supra note 44, at 282 (“[F]atherhood remains, in significant part, a 
‘secondary’ or derivative relationship that requires an initial determination of the child’s 
first or ‘primary’ parent, the mother.”); NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2329 (“[T]he mother 
remains the parental figure who establishes the family, while the father is a secondary, 
optional parent, potentially supplementing but certainly not replacing the mother.”). 
 207 See supra Part II. 
 208 See supra Part II.  
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IV. WHY THE LAW SHOULD EXTEND NON-ADOPTIVE MARRIAGE-BASED 
AVENUES OF ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE TO MALE SAME-SEX COUPLES 
A. Remedying the Unwarranted, Unnecessary Harm to Male Same-Sex 
Couples and their Children Resulting from Current Parentage Law 
Excluding male same-sex couples who conceive children via 
surrogacy from non-adoptive marriage-based avenues to establishing 
parentage and requiring them to undertake adoption in order to 
establish parentage for the non-biological intended parent results in 
unwarranted, unnecessary harm to male same-sex couples and their 
children.209 Generally, in a stepparent adoption, which married male 
same-sex couples nationwide may now utilize pursuant to Obergefell, 
the spouse of the child’s legal parent can adopt the child and the legal 
parent can maintain his or her parentage provided that if the child 
already has a second legal parent, they have consented to the 
termination of their parental rights.210 However, because in most 
jurisdictions the law conclusively presumes that the surrogate is a legal 
parent if no genetic intended mother exists, stepparent adoption 
represents a viable avenue for male same-sex couples to establish the 
non-biological intended parent’s legal parentage only when the 
surrogate is willing to surrender her parental rights.211 Despite the prior 
execution of a surrogacy contract in which the surrogate agreed to 
relinquish her parental rights, unless there is a judicial determination 
that the surrogate is an unfit parent whose rights are subject to 
involuntarily termination, the stepparent adoption cannot occur 
without the surrogate’s consent.212 While in the vast majority of cases 
the surrogate is willing to surrender her parental rights in accordance 
with the surrogacy contract,213 in the rare instances when the surrogate 
 
 209 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2308, 2313 (describing this approach as 
“consistent with the approach of most other states” and further stating that “[i]n most 
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 210 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 110. 
 211 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2320 (“While adoption will ultimately yield legal 
parentage for some, it may be impossible for others, meaning that legal recognition 
remains out of reach. Terminating the rights of the individual presumed by law to be 
the parent may not be feasible.”). 
 212 See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text. 
 213 See Snyder & Byrn, supra note 108, at 643 n.27 (citing Deborah Morgenstern 
Katz, Womb for Rent, PARENTING MAG., Dec./Jan. 2002, at 86); see also Joanna L. 
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Agreement, Part Two, FINDLAW (Jan. 20, 2010), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-
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changes her mind, the stepparent adoption requirement effectively 
prevents married male same-sex couples from establishing both 
members of the couple as the child’s legal parents. 
Even when the surrogate is willing to relinquish her parental rights, 
the stepparent adoption process can be expensive, lengthy, and 
burdensome.214 Specifically, “many individuals require the assistance of 
an attorney to navigate the process, and the procedure often requires 
submitting various documents, paying court fees, appearing in court, 
submitting to a background check, and undergoing some form of post-
placement supervision.”215 Some courts also require financial 
accountings and invasive home studies.216 Stepparent adoptions can 
cost several thousand dollars and may take months to complete.217 
Couples who lack the resources or knowledge necessary to complete 
the stepparent adoption process will be excluded from establishing legal 
parentage for the non-biological intended parent. 
Importantly, until the adoption is completed, the non-biological 
intended parent is not a legal parent and thus lacks the myriad rights 
and obligations that accompany legal parentage, including, for example, 
medical decision-making and custodial rights as well as support 
obligations.218 This leaves both the child and the non-biological 
intended parent without essential rights and protections and in a state 
of limbo.219 If the couple’s relationship ends before the adoption is 
completed, the non-biological intended parent, a legal stranger to the 
child at that point, will be left completely “at the mercy of [their] former 
partner.”220 Requiring married male same-sex couples to pursue 
adoption in order for the non-biological intended parent to establish 
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biological intended parent and society at large. The message is that the 
non-biological parent is not a “real” parent but instead is a “parental 
substitute[] who must formally replace the biological parent[] [(here 
the surrogate)] through adoption.”221 This message is likely to further 
stigmatize families headed by male same-sex couples and lead to 
feelings of insecurity and inferiority for the non-biological intended 
parent.  
The harm to male same-sex couples and their families resulting from 
the denial of marriage-based avenues to establishing parentage is 
unwarranted — there is a wide body of social science research 
indicating that the skills and abilities required to successfully raise 
children exist in both men and women and in both different- and same-
sex couples. Specifically, studies have demonstrated that men who serve 
as primary caretakers to their children are as capable as women who 
serve in that role and that children raised by male same-sex couples 
function as well as children raised by different-sex couples and female 
same-sex couples across an array of measures.222 In terms of the findings 
of studies involving men who are primary caretakers for their children, 
“[t]he most critical fact that emerges about how men parent is that 
when men do nurture children as a primary parent, men parent 
essentially like mothers. Men parent as well as women do, and their way 
of parenting is not unique.”223 As Professor Nancy Dowd has explained, 
the research indicates that “[g]ood parenting is neither sex-specific nor 
sex-related.”224 
With regard to studies of children raised by gay and lesbian parents, 
as the American Sociological Association has explained,  
The clear and consistent social science consensus is that 
children raised by same-sex parents fare just as well as children 
raised by different-sex parents. Decades of methodologically 
sound social science research, including multiple nationally 
representative studies and expert evidence introduced in courts 
around the country, confirm that positive child wellbeing is the 
product of stability in the relationship between the two parents, 
stability in the relationship between the parents and the child, 
and sufficient parental socioeconomic resources. The wellbeing 
 
 221 Id. at 2319. 
 222 See infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. 
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of children does not depend on the sex or sexual orientation of 
their parents.225 
Specifically, research indicates that children of same-sex parents scored 
as well as or better than children of different-sex parents on measures 
such as mental health, cognitive development, psychological 
adjustment, academic success, quality of the parent-child relationship, 
and overall well-being.226 As a result, leading social science and medical 
organizations, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics, the 
American Medical Association, the American Psychological 
Association, and the American Sociological Association, have issued 
statements expressing support for the legal recognition of same-sex 
parents.227 
Moreover, the substantial burden that married male same-sex couples 
and surrogates bear as a result of a legal framework that requires an 
adoption procedure in order for the surrogate’s rights to be terminated 
and the non-biological intended parent’s rights to be established is an 
unnecessary, counterproductive one. Disputes over parentage in the 
surrogacy context are rare — “[i]t is anecdotally reported that, of the 
estimated 14,000 to 16,000 surrogacies completed through 2002, only 
88 resulted in disputes over parentage.”228 When the law requires an 
adoption procedure in order for the surrogate’s parentage to be 
terminated and the non-biological intended parent’s parentage to be 
established, it forces legal parentage on the surrogate against her wishes 
and denies parental rights to the child’s non-biological intended parent 
 
 225 Brief for American Sociological Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 2, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-
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promote the wellbeing of the children of same-sex couples). 
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until the costly, intrusive adoption process is completed. It is also 
deeply problematic that in many jurisdictions, despite the fact that the 
surrogate’s relationship to the child is exactly the same in either 
scenario, the surrogate avoids legal parentage if the intended mother’s 
ova were used in conception but is conclusively deemed the child’s legal 
parent if the intended parents utilized donor ova.229 Extending 
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex 
couples who conceive children via surrogacy would better and more 
efficiently effectuate the intent of all of the parties involved in the 
surrogacy agreement in the overwhelming majority of cases.230  
In addition, it is already well entrenched under current law that an 
individual who does not share a genetic connection to a child may 
establish legal parentage on the basis of their marriage to the child’s 
biological parent. Across the country, marital presumption laws 
establish parentage for the different- or same-sex spouse of an 
individual who conceives or gives birth to a child during the 
marriage.231 Similarly, spousal consent to assisted reproduction laws 
across the country provide parentage to married individuals who, with 
the intent to be the resulting child’s parent, consent to their same- or 
different-sex spouse’s use of assisted reproduction to conceive a child.232 
Extending marriage-based parentage establishment avenues to male 
same-sex couples who conceive via surrogacy would be a logical 
expansion of these existing laws. Furthermore, while extending 
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex 
couples would require legal recognition that giving birth does not 
necessarily conclusively establish an individual’s parentage, this also is 
not a new concept. In allowing genetic intended mothers in the 
surrogacy context to establish their parentage and to rebut and 
disestablish the surrogate’s parentage through non-adoptive avenues, 
the law in many states already recognizes that giving birth does not 
always conclusively establish legal parentage.233  
Finally, denying male same-sex couples access to non-adoptive 
marriage-based avenues to establishing parentage runs afoul of the 
modern justifications for maintaining marriage-based parentage 
presumptions. As discussed above, there are a number of justifications 
for marriage-based parentage presumptions that remain relevant today. 
These justifications include protecting the integrity of marriages, 
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fostering marital harmony and unity, promoting childrearing within 
marriage, and providing stable homes for children.234 Each of these 
justifications supports the application of marriage-based avenues of 
establishing parentage to all married couples, regardless of the genders 
of the spouses. 
B. Dismantling Harmful Gender-Based Stereotypes 
Extending non-adoptive marriage-based avenues to establishing 
parentage to male same-sex couples falls within the scope of the type of 
legal reform that will help to dismantle harmful and confining gender-
based stereotypes and expectations. This certainly is not to say that 
extending marriage-based parentage to male same-sex couples will, on 
its own, dismantle the gender-based stereotypes embedded in our laws 
and society — it will not. However, adopting laws such as this that 
challenge existing gender stereotypes and expectations around 
parenting and caretaking is undoubtedly important, and, if done on a 
large enough scale, will result in meaningful change. Broadly speaking, 
laws that recognize men as caretakers will help women in a number of 
ways, both in the workplace and in the domestic sphere. It is well 
established that women face discrimination in the workplace based 
upon assumptions about their current or future familial roles and 
caretaking responsibilities. As Professor Vicki Shultz has explained, 
“[h]istorically, workplace inequalities between men and women have 
been based on a biased set of attitudes and assumptions casting women 
as secondary workers . . . [who] are committed first and foremost to 
their domestic roles.”235 Many employers continue to assume that 
women are, will be, or should be primarily responsible for the care of 
their home and family members, and that men are, will be, or should be 
primarily responsible for supporting their families financially.236 As a 
result, employers often view women as both less committed to their 
careers and less competent at their jobs than their male counterparts.237 
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These assumptions lead to discrimination against women in, inter alia, 
hiring, promotion, pay, and retention.238  
Today, 42% of women report experiencing gender-based 
discrimination in the workplace,239 and women are severely 
underrepresented in leadership positions across a wide array of fields.240 
A significant gender wage gap persists in the United States, with women 
who work fulltime earning only approximately 80% as much as men 
who work fulltime; the wage gap is substantially larger for Black, Latina, 
and Hispanic women.241 Across a variety of fields and types of jobs, 
“women regularly are paid less than men working in the same 
occupation.”242 As a 2013 report from the National Equal Pay Task 
Force explains, “the gender pay gap exists for women working full time 
as well as part time, and begins when women are first employed, which 
is often well before they have children.”243 
For women who are also mothers, the discriminatory treatment 
stemming from gendered assumptions and beliefs around caretaking is 
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even more pronounced. As compared to women without children, 
mothers receive lower wages, are less likely to be hired and promoted, 
are perceived as less competent, and are subjected to “harsher 
performance and punctuality standards.”244 Fathers, on the other hand, 
are more likely than childless men to be hired, and men tend to receive 
higher wages after they have children.245 While employers tend to 
assume that men who are fathers will be more committed to their work 
in order to provide financially for their families, women who are 
mothers are perceived as less committed to their work and “more 
distractible when on the job.”246 In one study, women whose resumes 
indicated that they were parents (by mentioning membership in a 
parent-teacher association) were half as likely to receive interview 
invitations as women whose otherwise identical resumes did not 
indicate that they were parents.247 Men whose resumes indicated that 
they were parents, however, were actually slightly more likely to receive 
interview invitations than men whose resumes did not indicate that they 
were parents.248 In a related study, when participants were placed in the 
role of an employer and asked how much they would pay job applicants, 
“[m]others were offered on average $11,000 less than childless women 
and $13,000 less than fathers.”249 Research also indicates that, after 
controlling for the usual occupational and human capital factors that 
affect wages, working women in the United States receive, on average, 
a 5% wage penalty per child.250 
Moreover, at home, women are still engaging in a greater share of 
housework and caretaking. Although men are performing more 
caretaking and housework than in the past, mothers today spend 
approximately twice the amount of time caring for their children as 
fathers, and women spend eight more hours than men completing 
 
 244 Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood 
Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1316 (2007); see Gaunt, supra note 202, at 5-6; Pulido, 
supra note 237, at 135; see also ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 155, at 196. The degree of the 
motherhood penalty varies by race. Research indicates that the motherhood wage 
penalty for Black and Latina women, for example, may be less. Id. (citing Asmara M. 
Tekle, The “Non-Maternal Wall” and Women of Color in High Governmental Office, 35 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 169, 175-78 (2010)). 
 245 Miller, supra note 236; see Miranda McGowan, The Parent Trap: Equality, Sex and 
Partnership in the Modern Law Firm, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (2019). 
 246 Miller, supra note 236. 
 247 See Correll et al., supra note 244, at 1329-30. 
 248 See id. at 1330. 
 249 Miller, supra note 236. 
 250 Correll et al., supra note 244, at 1297. 
  
1556 University of California, Davis [Vol. 54:1507 
housework each week.251 Furthermore, even though couples in which 
both members work fulltime increasingly report sharing equally in 
childcare and housework, among these couples mothers are still 
significantly more likely than fathers to be doing a greater share of the 
work involved in raising children and maintaining the household.252 In 
addition, women are significantly more likely than men to interrupt 
their careers in order to care for a child or family member.253 In a 2013 
Pew Research Poll, a significantly higher percentage of mothers as 
compared to fathers indicated that they had reduced their hours at 
work, taken a substantial amount of time off from work, or quit their 
jobs in order to care for a child or family member.254 
Legal reform such as that proposed in this Article that recognizes the 
caretaking disposition and capabilities of men sends a message that 
directly contradicts gender-based stereotypes and assumptions around 
caretaking responsibilities that harm and confine women.255 In allowing 
male same-sex couples to establish legal parentage through the 
marriage-based avenues available to different-sex couples and female 
same-sex couples, the law would be recognizing that caretaking is not a 
“woman’s role,” but rather a role that can be, and is, fulfilled by both 
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women and men.256 Legal reform that promotes messages like this, if 
accomplished on a broad enough scale, will help to dismantle the 
“stereotype that only women are responsible for family caregiving.”257 
As legal and societal recognition that caretaking is not a gender-specific 
role increases, employers will be less likely to resort to the harmful 
gender-based beliefs and assumptions around caretaking that have 
plagued women in the workplace.258  
Legal reform that recognizes men as fully capable, nurturing, and 
responsible caretakers and parents also will help to combat the 
persistent gender-based expectations of women that exist in the 
domestic sphere.259 On a broad scale, as legal and societal recognition 
that men are fully capable of undertaking the wide range of activities 
associated with successful childrearing increases, the likelihood that 
different-sex couples will automatically resort to traditional gender-
based caretaking roles and expectations when they have children will 
continue to decrease.260 As caretaking becomes less synonymous with 
motherhood, different-sex couples will increasingly be left to make 
decisions about domestic responsibilities based upon considerations 
other than gender. Importantly, dismantling gender-based caretaking 
expectations within the domestic sphere will promote the dismantling 
of gender-based caretaking expectations in the workplace and vice 
versa.261 Although there is still significant progress to be made, women 
today are gaining increasing equality in both the workplace and 
domestic sphere. Laws that serve to facilitate and normalize male 
caretaking, such as those that advance parentage establishment for male 
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same-sex couples, will help to ensure that the momentum toward 
women’s equality continues.262  
Laws that reflect the recognition that children can thrive under the 
care of men also can help to disrupt the assumptions and stereotypes 
that harm and confine men. Today, it is increasingly common for men 
to “want to escape the bonds of the breadwinner stereotype so that they 
can be more connected and involved fathers and partners who equally 
share the load at home with their spouses.”263 Men are taking on 
significantly more caretaking and housework than in the past,264 and 
the percentage of fathers who serve as stay-at-home parents also is on 
the rise.265 In a recent Pew Research Poll, fathers were almost as likely 
as mothers to indicate that they would rather be raising their children 
than working.266 Additionally, although “[f]athers have nearly tripled 
their time with [their] children since 1965,” almost half of the fathers 
surveyed indicated that they felt the amount of time they were currently 
able to spend with their children was still not enough.267  
Despite these significant changes in men’s caretaking attitudes and 
behaviors, men who engage in substantial caretaking continue to face 
discrimination and stigmatization. Notably, “[m]en who treat 
caregiving as a primary concern face discrimination and hostility in the 
workplace.”268 For example, men who seek to utilize family leave or 
flexible work policies to engage in caretaking activities report being met 
with skepticism and retaliation in the workplace.269 Similarly, men who 
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seek to return to work after leaving the workforce to care for their 
children also report experiencing discrimination.270 Moreover, the 
stigmatization and discrimination experienced by men who engage in 
primary caretaking is not confined to the workplace. For example, as 
discussed above, society views stay-at-home fathers as less competent 
than stay-at-home mothers.271 Furthermore, while a large segment of 
the population continues to believe that the ideal situation for children 
is to have a mother who stays at home part- or full-time, the percentage 
of people who believe the same about fathers is drastically lower.272 The 
view that a man’s role is to provide financially for his family lingers, and 
men who serve as primary caretakers report being met with discomfort, 
disapproval, and judgment as they move through the world.273 
It is likely that the adoption of laws and policies that serve to support 
and normalize families in which primary caretaking responsibilities are 
undertaken by men will lead to more men taking on caretaking 
responsibilities.274 As male caretaking becomes increasingly common, 
the stereotypes and stigmatization that plague male caretakers will 
further dissipate, and employers and society at large will be less likely 
to perceive male caretaking as suspicious or improper. In sum, laws that 
reflect a recognition that caretaking is not a gender-specific activity, 
including those that facilitate the establishment of parentage in male 
same-sex couples, collectively will help in the ongoing efforts to free 
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both women and men from the confines of traditional gender roles and 
the significant harms that stem therefrom. 
V. PROPOSAL: EXTENDING NON-ADOPTIVE MARRIAGE-BASED AVENUES 
TO ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE TO MALE SAME-SEX COUPLES 
At first glance, it may seem that efforts aimed at providing parentage 
to married male same-sex couples who conceive children via surrogacy 
should focus exclusively on advancing surrogacy statutes that recognize 
intended parents as legal parents regardless of gender or biological 
connection to the child. While this is undoubtedly an extremely 
important goal, extending marriage-based avenues of establishing 
parentage to male same-sex couples is also an essential step for attaining 
equality for male same-sex couples in the parentage realm. Although 
the first surrogacy agreement in the United States occurred in 1976,275 
today many states still lack statutes or appellate case law governing 
surrogacy and only a minority of states have surrogacy laws recognizing 
both members of a married couple as legal parents in situations in which 
the child is conceived using donor ova and sperm from one of the 
intended parents.276 The hesitancy of states to address surrogacy and 
the vast disparity in the approaches of the states that do have laws 
governing surrogacy make it essential to advance other methods of 
establishing parentage for male same-sex couples while simultaneously 
seeking to advance inclusive state surrogacy laws.  
When it comes to facilitating parentage establishment for same-sex 
couples, a number of states may find it easier or more palatable to 
extend to same-sex couples the longstanding avenues of establishing 
parentage that already exist, as opposed to creating new avenues of 
parentage establishment, such as surrogacy-based avenues.277 For 
example, states have extended longstanding marriage-based avenues of 
establishing parentage to female same-sex couples simply by adopting 
gender neutral language to refer to the person who is deemed a parent 
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on the basis of their marriage to the individual who gave birth.278 In 
addition, even when same- or different-sex couples utilize surrogacy in 
a state that does not recognize the surrogacy agreement itself as 
establishing legal parentage for the intended parents, in many instances 
genetic intended parents have been able to use well-established 
genetics-based avenues to obtain legal parentage.279 It is likely that in a 
number of the states that lack surrogacy laws providing parentage to 
male same-sex couples, the strategy of extending longstanding avenues 
of establishing parentage, such as the existing marriage-based avenues, 
will provide the quickest path to achieving non-adoptive parentage 
establishment for male same-sex couples. 
Among the states that do not have surrogacy laws providing parentage 
to the non-biological intended parent when conception occurs using 
sperm from their spouse and donor ova, the ease of extending marriage-
based parentage establishment avenues to male same-sex couples will 
depend on the state’s approach to the disestablishment of legal 
parentage for surrogates. As discussed above, in most states, when the 
surrogacy agreement is not recognized as establishing the intended 
parents as legal parents, non-adoptive disestablishment of a surrogate’s 
legal parentage is allowed only when there is a genetic intended mother 
seeking to establish maternity — which would not usually exist in the 
context of male same-sex couples.280 In a couple of these states, 
however, the surrogate’s legal parentage can be disestablished through 
non-adoptive avenues even when there is no genetic intended mother 
seeking to establish maternity.281 In these states, extending marriage-
based parentage establishment avenues to male same-sex couples will 
be the most straightforward and will require the least amount of reform 
to existing laws. 
Maryland is one of these minority jurisdictions. Despite rendering 
surrogacy agreements unenforceable, Maryland allows for the 
disestablishment of the surrogate’s legal maternity through genetics-
based avenues similar to those applicable to paternity disestablishment 
when a child is conceived using sperm from an intended parent and 
donor ova (meaning there is no genetic intended mother).282 In In re 
Roberto d.B., an unmarried man and a gestational surrogate entered into 
a surrogacy agreement through which a child was to be conceived using 
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the man’s sperm and donor ova.283 Against the parties’ wishes, the 
surrogate’s name was listed on the child’s birth certificate along with the 
biological father’s name, and the trial court rejected the parties’ petition 
seeking the issuance of an accurate birth certificate that listed only the 
name of the biological father.284 The Maryland Court of Appeals held 
that pursuant to equal protection principles, women must be able to 
utilize the genetics-based parentage disestablishment procedures 
available to men.285 As a result, the surrogate could disestablish her 
maternity on the basis of her lack of genetic connection to the child 
even through there was no genetic intended mother seeking to establish 
maternity.286  
Iowa allows for the disestablishment of the surrogate’s legal parentage 
in this context through a different avenue. Although Iowa law does not 
allow the non-biological intended parent to establish parentage through 
enforcement of the surrogacy agreement when a child is conceived 
using sperm from the other intended parent and donor ova, it 
nonetheless allows for the surrogate’s legal parentage to be 
disestablished through enforcement of the surrogacy agreement in this 
situation.287 In P.M. v. T.B., the intended parents, a married couple, 
sought to enforce the surrogacy agreement after the surrogate and her 
husband refused to deliver the child, who was conceived using sperm 
from the intended father and donor ova.288 The Iowa Supreme Court 
held that a “gestational surrogacy contract is legally enforceable in favor 
of the intended, biological father against a surrogate mother and her 
husband who are not the child’s genetic parents.”289 While the court 
indicated that the non-biological intended parent, the biological father’s 
wife, would need to pursue adoption in order to establish legal 
parentage, enforcement of the surrogacy agreement served to establish 
parentage in the biological father and to disestablish parentage in the 
surrogate even though there was no genetic intended mother seeking to 
establish maternity.290 
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Application of marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to 
male same-sex couples will be relatively straightforward in jurisdictions 
like Maryland and Iowa that, despite not recognizing the surrogacy 
agreement as establishing parentage in the non-biological intended 
parent when a child is conceived using sperm from the other intended 
parent and donor ova, nonetheless allow for the disestablishment of the 
surrogate’s legal parentage through genetics- or surrogacy-based 
avenues. As an initial matter, in these jurisdictions, it is not necessary 
to relegate the establishment of parentage for the biological father’s 
spouse (the non-biological intended parent) to the adoption realm. 
When legal parentage conclusively attaches to an individual based upon 
the act of giving birth, generally it can only be voluntarily terminated 
through formal adoption procedures.291 However, if the legal parentage 
presumed based upon the act of giving birth is rebuttable through 
genetics- or surrogacy-based avenues, the surrogate whose legal 
parentage is rebutted will no longer have parental rights that must be 
formally terminated.  
Moreover, in these jurisdictions, the concern that applying marriage-
based parentage presumptions to the spouses of biological fathers will 
result in the simultaneous establishment of legal parentage in more than 
two individuals does not pose a major problem. If the surrogate’s legal 
maternity is disestablished, there will be only one legal parent, the 
biological father, and thus extending marriage-based presumptions to 
his spouse at that point will not result in the child having more than 
two legal parents. In fact, if marriage-based parentage presumptions do 
not apply to the biological father’s spouse, the child will have only one 
legally recognized parent when the surrogate’s maternity is 
disestablished. Overall, extending marriage-based avenues of parentage 
establishment to male same-sex couples will be a relatively simple and 
straightforward undertaking in these jurisdictions and will promote 
important government interests in identifying two legal parents for 
every child from the earliest possible point.292  
The decision in In re Maria-lrene D., one of the only reported cases 
(perhaps the only reported case) to date in which a court applied a 
marriage-based parentage presumption to the same-sex spouse of the 
child’s biological father,293 demonstrates the straightforward nature of 
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applying marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to male 
same-sex couples in situations where the surrogate’s legal parentage has 
been disestablished.294 In In re Maria-lrene D., a married male same-sex 
couple jointly executed a surrogacy agreement, and the surrogate later 
gave birth to a child conceived from donor ova and sperm from one 
member of the couple.295 The couple commenced a judicial proceeding 
in Missouri through which they sought and obtained a judicial 
determination that neither the ova donor nor the surrogate had parental 
rights.296 During the proceeding, the court awarded the spouse whose 
sperm had been used to conceive the child, “as the genetic father, . . . 
‘sole and exclusive custody’ of the child.”297  
After the couple separated, the biological father’s new partner adopted 
the child.298 The biological father’s former spouse sought to vacate the 
adoption on the grounds that, as a legal parent, he was entitled to notice 
of the adoption and an opportunity to be heard, neither of which he had 
received.299 In upholding the Family Court’s decision to vacate the 
adoption, the New York intermediate appellate court held that the 
biological father’s marriage to his former spouse at the time the child 
was born gave rise to the presumption under state law that a child born 
into a marriage is the legitimate child of both spouses, which bestowed 
parental rights on the former spouse.300 In this case, because the 
surrogate’s parental rights had been disestablished, the court could 
apply a marriage-based presumption of parentage to the biological 
father’s spouse without the need for an adoption proceeding to 
terminate the surrogate’s rights and without fear that application of the 
presumption would result in the biological father, the biological father’s 
spouse, the surrogate, and the surrogate’s spouse (if any) all being 
entitled to legal parentage.  
The availability of procedures for rebutting and disestablishing the 
surrogate’s presumed legal parentage creates a clear path to extending 
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marriage-based parentage presumptions to male same-sex couples. 
Since most states do not allow for the rebuttal and disestablishment of 
the gestational surrogate’s parentage when there is no genetic intended 
mother,301 reform must start with creating avenues for rebutting and 
disestablishing the presumed legal parentage that attaches based upon 
the act of giving birth in situations involving donor ova. While 
eliminating the presumption of parentage that attaches based upon the 
act of giving birth is another option that would facilitate the application 
of marriage-based avenues of parentage establishment to male same-sex 
couples, it is safe to assume that most states will continue to presume 
an individual’s legal parentage based upon the act of giving birth. 
Although in modern times gestation and genetics no longer necessarily 
coincide, this longstanding practice not only reflects a recognition of 
the critically important, substantial caregiving work and nurturing 
undertaken by individuals who gestate and give birth to children,302 it 
also bestows parentage to an individual who, in addition to gestating 
the child, is the child’s genetic and intended parent in the vast majority 
of instances.303 Consequently, efforts to extend marriage-based 
presumptions to male same-sex couples should focus on adopting 
procedures for rebutting and disestablishing the legal parentage that the 
law presumes based on the act of giving birth, as opposed to eliminating 
presumptions of parentage stemming from the act of giving birth.  
In determining how to structure the rules governing the rebuttal and 
disestablishment of the presumed legal maternity that attaches based 
upon the act of giving birth, it is important to consider the processes 
that states already have in place for the rebuttal and disestablishment of 
presumed legal paternity. For example, in the context of the marital 
presumption of parentage, rebuttal of the husband’s presumed paternity 
requires, at a minimum, proof that the man and the child do not share 
a genetic tie.304 If the child is conceived via assisted reproduction, 
considerations relating to both genetics and intent will factor into 
rebuttal of the husband’s presumed parentage. Specifically, although 
rebuttal of the husband’s presumed parentage will still require proof of 
a lack of genetic tie between the husband and child, the rebuttal action 
will fail if the husband consented to his wife’s use of assisted 
reproduction with the intent to be the resulting child’s parent in 
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compliance with the state’s spousal consent to assisted reproduction 
law.305  
Notably, many states have adopted provisions in their parentage 
codes indicating that, to the extent reasonable, the standards governing 
paternity determinations should apply to maternity determinations.306 
As the court explained in In re Roberto d.B., equal protection principles 
support extending to women the paternity disestablishment procedures 
available to men.307 Indeed, a number of states have already applied 
paternity establishment principles in the maternity establishment 
context by allowing genetic intended mothers to establish their legal 
maternity and rebut and disestablish the legal maternity of the surrogate 
through genetics-based avenues akin to those that apply in paternity 
determinations.308 It is clear that adopting methods for the rebuttal and 
disestablishment of maternity will not require states to create a wholly 
novel set of rules governing parentage determinations; rather, existing 
laws and procedures can be reformed and restructured to provide 
avenues for maternity rebuttal and disestablishment. 
Genetics-focused avenues present a logical, well-established method 
for rebutting and disestablishing presumed legal parentage, and such 
avenues should form a core component of procedures governing the 
rebuttal and disestablishment of the presumed legal parentage that 
attaches to an individual based upon the act of giving birth. However, it 
is important that genetics are not the sole consideration in actions to 
rebut the presumption of legal parentage that attaches to an individual 
based upon the act of giving birth. This is because it is not only 
surrogates who carry and give birth to children with whom they lack a 
genetic tie. Intended mothers who cannot conceive children using their 
own ova may utilize donor ova and sperm from a partner or donor to 
become pregnant.309 In this situation, a standard that allowed for the 
rebuttal and disestablishment of the legal parentage of the individual 
who gave birth solely on the basis of their lack of genetic ties to the 
child would be problematic. As a result, notions of intent, along with 
genetics-based considerations, must play a role in standards governing 
the rebuttal and disestablishment of the legal parentage that attaches to 
an individual based upon the act of giving birth.  
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The standard for rebutting and disestablishing the presumed legal 
parentage that attaches to an individual based upon the act of giving 
birth should require proof both that the individual lacks a genetic tie to 
the child and that the individual and the intended parent(s) undertook 
conception with the intent and understanding that the child’s intended 
parent(s) would be the child’s sole legal parent(s). The most obvious 
evidence of the requisite intent would be a surrogacy agreement entered 
into between the individual who gave birth and the intended parent(s). 
The state would not have to recognize the surrogacy agreement itself as 
establishing or disestablishing any of the parties’ legal parentage. 
Instead, the surrogacy agreement would serve as persuasive evidence of 
the intent component of the proposed standard for rebutting and 
disestablishing the presumed legal parentage of the individual who gave 
birth. In defining the intent element of the proposed rebuttal standard, 
states would be free to adopt the type of procedural and substantive 
requirements for establishing the existence of meaningful, informed 
consent that already exist within many states’ laws governing parentage 
establishment in the assisted reproduction context.310  
Establishing grounds for rebuttal and disestablishment of maternity 
that combine genetics- and intent-based considerations is not a major 
leap from existing practices. As discussed above, even when the 
surrogacy agreement is not enforceable, in many states the surrogate’s 
parentage can be rebutted and disestablished when there is a genetic 
intended mother seeking to establish maternity.311 When this occurs, 
the disestablishment of the surrogate’s parentage is based upon notions 
of both genetics and intent — the individual who gave birth lacks a 
genetic tie to the child and the individual whose ova were used to 
conceive the child intended to be the child’s parent, while the individual 
who gave birth did not. In these cases, despite not recognizing the 
enforceability of the surrogacy agreement, the court identifies the 
individual who gave birth as a “surrogate,” meaning the court perceives 
the situation as one in which, at the time of conception, the parties had 
the mutual intent for the intended parent(s), and not the individual who 
gave birth, to be the child’s legal parent(s).312 If the individual who gave 
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birth conceived the child using donor ova with the intent to be the 
child’s parent and there were no intended parents with whom the 
individual had entered into a surrogacy agreement or something akin to 
it, her maternity likely could not be disestablished based solely upon 
her lack of genetic tie to the child.313 Thus, many states’ current 
standards governing the rebuttal and disestablishment of maternity in 
situations involving unenforceable surrogacy agreements consider not 
only genetics but also intent. In addition to being a logical extension of 
existing standards governing maternity rebuttal and disestablishment, 
the proposed standard will remedy the deeply problematic current 
situation wherein something as important as the gestational surrogate’s 
parentage often hinges upon whether the intended parents utilized ova 
from the intended mother or a donor.314 
It is possible that some states, in an effort to acknowledge the essential 
work undertaken by the individual who carries and gives birth to a 
child, would seek to structure maternity rebuttal actions such that only 
the surrogate could seek to rebut and disestablish her legal parentage. 
This would at least alleviate the problem of surrogates having legal 
parentage attach to them against their wishes. Furthermore, even a 
restricted rebuttal avenue such as this would help the vast majority of 
married male same-sex couples who conceive via surrogacy, since in 
most cases both the surrogate and the intended parents wish to establish 
the intended parents as the child’s legal parents.315 However, a rule 
providing that only the person who gave birth may seek to rebut and 
disestablish their legal parentage would place intended parents in an 
extremely risky position, leaving them without adequate protections in 
situations in which the surrogate changed her mind after entering into 
the surrogacy agreement. Moreover, the requirements of the proposed 
standard — the lack of genetic tie between the surrogate and child and 
the parties’ undertaking of the child’s conception with the intent and 
understanding that the child’s intended parent(s) would be the child’s 
sole legal parent(s) — do not include that the surrogate’s intent remain 
static following conception. 
After establishing procedures for the rebuttal and disestablishment of 
the presumed legal parentage that attaches to an individual based upon 
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the act of giving birth, states will need to amend their existing marriage-
based avenues of establishing parentage to specify that the avenues will 
apply to the spouses of biological, legally recognized fathers in instances 
when the legal parentage of the individual who gave birth is rebutted 
and disestablished through the relevant procedures. Specifically, marital 
presumption of parentage laws will need to be amended to reflect that 
if the child is born or conceived during marriage, the spouse of a 
biological, legally recognized father will be presumed to be the child’s 
parent when the parentage of the individual who gave birth has been 
rebutted and disestablished through the requisite procedures. Similarly, 
consent to assisted reproduction laws will need to be amended to reflect 
that when a child is conceived through assisted reproduction, the 
spouse of the child’s biological, legally recognized father is the child’s 
parent if the spouse consented to the biological father’s use of assisted 
reproduction and the parentage of the individual who gave birth has 
been rebutted and disestablished. In addition, to avoid confusion, laws 
setting forth marriage-based parentage presumptions should specify 
that they are not applicable to the spouse of an individual whose 
presumed legal maternity based upon the act of giving birth has been 
rebutted and disestablished. Finally, it is important that individuals in 
same-sex marriages who qualify as legal parents pursuant to the 
marriage-based avenues available in their state nonetheless obtain court 
orders reflecting their parental status in order to ensure that other states 
will recognize their legal parentage.316 
It is important to note that this proposal also would open the door for 
the extension of existing non-marital avenues of establishing parentage 
to male same-sex couples who conceive a child via surrogacy using 
donor ova and sperm from one member of the couple. For example, if 
the surrogate’s maternity is rebutted and disestablished through the 
relevant procedures, statutes that provide legal parentage to a non-
marital partner who consents to an individual’s use of assisted 
reproduction to become pregnant could be extended to a non-marital 
partner who consents to the biological father’s use of surrogacy to have 
a child.317 Similarly, voluntary acknowledgment of parentage 
procedures also could be extended to the biological father’s non-marital 
 
 316 See Appleton, supra note 44, at 290 n.371 (explaining that “the full faith and 
credit owed to other states’ laws . . . permits the second forum to refuse recognition 
based on its own public policy, [while] the full faith and credit owed to other states’ 
judgments and decrees . . . leaves no room for nonrecognition based on public policy”). 
 317 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 3:3 (identifying jurisdictions that have statutes 
providing parentage based upon consent to a spouse or partner’s use of assisted 
reproduction that are gender neutral and do not require the parties to be married). 
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partner.318 With the surrogate’s maternity disestablished, there will be 
no need for an adoption procedure to terminate the surrogate’s legal 
rights and no reason to fear that the extension of non-marital avenues 
of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples will necessarily lead 
to the simultaneous establishment of legal parentage in more than two 
individuals. 
Finally, while this Article has focused on providing male same-sex 
couples with access to non-adoptive methods of establishing parentage, 
it is important to note that the proposal also will aid in the 
establishment of parentage for non-biological intended mothers in the 
surrogacy context. As discussed above, when a different-sex married 
couple enters into a gestational surrogacy agreement in which a child is 
conceived using sperm from the intended father and ova from a gamete 
donor, only a minority of jurisdictions recognize the intended mother 
as a legal parent.319 Consequently, in most jurisdictions, a non-
biological intended mother must pursue costly, invasive adoption 
procedures in order to establish herself as the legal parent of a child 
conceived via surrogacy using sperm from her husband and donor ova. 
Under the proposal, however, upon rebuttal of the surrogate’s legal 
parentage, the spouse of the child’s biological, legally recognized father, 
regardless of their gender, will be able to establish legal parentage 
through marriage-based avenues. As a result, the proposal will provide 
critical parentage rights for both same- and different-sex couples who 
conceive children via surrogacy using sperm from one member of the 
couple and donor ova. 
CONCLUSION 
The exclusion of male same-sex couples from non-adoptive marriage-
based avenues of establishing parentage is extremely problematic. It is 
essential to challenge the harmful, inaccurate assumptions and beliefs 
that underlie this exclusion, as neither gender nor sexual orientation is 
determinative of an individual’s parenting abilities. Moreover, the 
conclusive provision of parentage based upon the act of giving birth, 
which presents a significant barrier to the extension of marriage-based 
avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples, is an 
outdated concept that is in need of reform. Establishing laws that permit 
rebuttal and disestablishment of the presumed parentage that attaches 
to an individual based upon the act of giving birth in appropriate 
circumstances and extending marriage-based parentage presumptions 
 
 318 See supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text. 
 319 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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to the spouse of the child’s biological, legally recognized father when 
rebuttal occurs, will advance a more equitable and effective legal 
framework for the establishment of parentage. In addition, laws that 
facilitate parentage for male same-sex couples will help to dismantle the 
persistent gender-based stereotypes around caretaking that harm and 
confine women and men both in the workplace and in the domestic 
sphere. 
 
